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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Executive summary 
 
In October 2009, the Equality and Human Rights Commission commissioned Global 
Partners & Associates and the Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute 
at London Metropolitan University to undertake research to identify and explore best 
practice processes for developing a new Bill of Rights for the UK. The research 
aimed to analyse evidence drawn from related domestic and international 
experiences, identify key principles that should underpin the development of a Bill of 
Rights, and identify policy implications in relation to any future process, regardless of 
which political party is in power.  
 
All three major parties at Westminster have pledged to initiate a process to create a 
Bill of Rights – without, in the main, acknowledging that the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
is, by commonly agreed definition, itself a Bill of Rights. The Labour government is 
consulting the public on a UK Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, while maintaining its 
commitment to the HRA, including both the rights enshrined in it and the mechanisms 
used to implement those rights. The Conservative Party has pledged to repeal the 
HRA and replace it with a ‘modern British Bill of Rights’. Repealing the HRA would 
mean that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) would no longer be 
incorporated into domestic law; the party has not indicated whether, or how, a future 
Bill of Rights might incorporate the ECHR using a different mechanism. The Liberal 
Democrats are committed to a written constitution with, at its heart, a Bill of Rights 
which would strengthen and entrench the rights guaranteed in the HRA. 
 
Methodology  
The research comprised:  
 
• A review of literature on Bills of Rights processes, focusing on Canada, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Australia and Northern Ireland.  
 
• Forty-three semi-structured interviews with people who have studied and/or 
been involved in Bills of Rights or analogous processes. 
 
• A seminar on 1 December 2009, held under Chatham House rules, which 
involved colleagues from human rights commissions in the UK, legal 
practitioners, academics and non-governmental organisations. 
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Main findings  
Comparative analysis of Bills of Rights processes outside Britain 
• Modern Bills of Rights differ in their provenance and the processes used to 
create them. Some processes were elite-led (Canada and New Zealand); others 
more participatory (Australia and Northern Ireland); some, over time, became  
a hybrid of the two (South Africa). Bills of Rights have not emerged in isolation. 
All have been fundamentally based on, or strongly influenced by, international 
human rights treaties. They may be viewed as a global collaborative project  
in which different jurisdictions have incorporated or built upon international 
human rights standards and adopted legislative models and processes 
developed elsewhere.   
 
• All Bills of Rights have been designed either to supplement existing human 
rights protection or to incorporate international human rights into domestic law  
– to go forwards, not backwards. No Bill of Rights process has permitted even 
the possibility of regression, either in terms of standards or mechanisms and 
institutions to protect rights. The way in which governments initiated reform, 
either through a draft bill and/or through the terms of reference or mandate for 
the process, expressly excluded this option.  
 
• In jurisdictions where there has been any degree of public participation in 
developing a Bill of Rights, the effect of that participation has been to give 
popular weight to the idea of human rights legislation and/or to expand or 
strengthen the government’s proposed legislative model in specific ways.  
 
• Most participants in this research stated that Bills of Rights processes benefit 
from a clear statement of intent from government about the purpose of a Bill of 
Rights and the terms of reference of the process for creating it.   
 
• Participants overwhelmingly favoured the establishment of an independent 
body, usually nominated on a cross-party basis, to lead the consultation. They 
suggested that the credibility of the process is likely to be enhanced if it is 
demonstrably non-partisan and has no vested interest in the outcome.  
 
• Most participants said it is imperative to elicit the views and experiences of 
groups whose human rights are most vulnerable to being breached. Bills of 
Rights processes in Northern Ireland and Australia have developed methods of 
working in partnership with community-based networks to achieve this.  
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• Most Bills of Rights processes have been consultative (the citizen as a 
‘sounding board’) rather than deliberative (the citizen as decision-maker). 
Deliberative forums have been shown to engender public trust if they are: 
adequately publicised to engage the wider public; are properly constructed to be 
representative, and if the government gives clear procedural commitments as to 
how it will act on their recommendations.  
 
• Most participants viewed raising public awareness and understanding of human 
rights as a primary aim of consultation: however, this has invariably been 
imperfectly achieved and is hard to measure. The credibility of a process is 
likely to be enhanced if public debate is as unconstrained as possible, while 
being informed to the greatest extent it can be about existing human rights 
protections and options for building on them.  
 
• Participants agreed that it is desirable for processes to have a defined 
timeframe with a momentum-building phase that aims to generate interest and 
participation and a clear procedure for what happens at the end of the process. 
 
• Participants concurred that the outcome of consultation should be transparent 
about the rationale for specific provisions and how these relate to community 
preferences and experiences. They said that the voices of relatively powerless 
groups should be given an elevated status in the processing of responses.   
 
• No Bill of Rights process has included notions of individual responsibility in its 
terms of reference for developing legislation; any decision to do so must be 
cognisant of the risk that debates about rights, citizenship, values and public 
policy priorities may act as a lightning rod for social anxieties and prejudices. 
Participants overwhelmingly agreed that responsibilities should be incorporated 
in the process solely in the context of education about the duty to respect the 
rights of others.  
 
• Whether - and how – democratic legitimacy is secured in the process of 
creating a Bill of Rights is a matter of experimental practice. In the three 
decades since Canada’s Charter of Rights was enacted, expectations have 
increased that any process to create a Bill of Rights will be genuinely 
participatory. This expectation is backed by developing law, theory and practice 
on the right to participation. It is further fuelled by the development of 
technology, and methods of consultation and deliberation, which permit ever 
broader, more inclusive and more sophisticated forms of public engagement. 
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The UK context  
• Our research suggests that current circumstances for any process to create  
a new UK Bill of Rights are unfavourable. Public understanding of, and 
enthusiasm for, a Bill of Rights is not assured and there is little discernable 
popular or civil society momentum behind the idea. The Labour government’s 
consultation on a proposed Bill of Rights and Responsibilities has not reached 
the wider public sphere. It remains to be seen how far the deliberative events 
held as part of the consultation might be used to ignite public interest and  
how far the consultation will engage directly with disadvantaged and  
disaffected groups. 
 
• Participants overwhelmingly suggested that the political discourse surrounding 
a Bill of Rights has not been commensurate with the gravity and complexity of 
the project. Many expressed disquiet about the prevalence of language and 
stories which have at times distorted the purported effects of human rights and 
the HRA. Further, they considered that a convincing case for why a new Bill of 
Rights is needed has not yet been made.  
  
• Many participants noted that, if a future Conservative government were to 
repeal the HRA and create a ‘British Bill of Rights’ that did not contain a new 
mechanism for incorporating the ECHR into domestic law, this would be a 
process without international precedent and would risk being viewed as 
illegitimate both at home and abroad.  
 
• Devolution presents considerable legal, constitutional and political obstacles 
which, while they may not be insuperable, must be negotiated sensitively if UK 
parties are to progress the Bill of Rights project. 
 
• It appears highly likely that if the HRA were amended or repealed, and/or a Bill 
of Rights were enacted covering the devolved jurisdictions, this would require 
amendments to the devolution statutes. Further, such a decision would almost 
certainly require the consent of the devolved legislatures in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, repeal of the HRA or any regression from 
those provisions of the ECHR already given domestic effect would be likely to 
breach the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. 
 
• The terms of reference for a UK-wide process and the methodologies by which 
it might be pursued have not been determined, either between the parties at 
Westminster or between the UK government and the executives in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland; this has exacerbated a sense of unease and 
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disengagement in the devolved nations. In particular, a process to create a Bill 
of Rights, whether ‘British’ or for the UK, risks inflaming sectarian divisions in 
Northern Ireland. 
  
Key principles  
These principles are based on the evidence from the processes of creating Bills of 
Rights in other jurisdictions. They are suggested as both (i) requirements for the 
conduct of any future process and (ii) a set of criteria to inform the decision about 
whether that process is worthy of engagement and against which it might be held up 
to scrutiny.  
 
A process of creating a Bill of Rights should be:  
 
Non-regressive  
Any future UK Bill of Rights should not dilute existing protection provided by the  
HRA, either in relation to the specific rights protected, or by weakening the existing 
machinery for the protection of Convention rights. Any process that starts from  
a premise of going backwards would set a damaging precedent internationally.  
Any future government must commit unequivocally to retaining the HRA unless and 
until a new Bill of Rights, protecting human rights to at least the same extent as the 
HRA, is enacted.  
 
Transparent 
Politicians should be transparent about the purpose of a Bill of Rights and the terms 
of reference and methods of the process by which they propose to create it. This 
entails a clear procedural commitment to act on the results of public consultation and 
deliberation within clearly articulated parameters.   
  
Independent  
The body running the process should be demonstrably non-partisan, independent of 
government and have no vested interest in the outcome.  
 
Democratic 
For the outcome to be seen as having democratic legitimacy, the process must also 
be democratic. This principle recognises that Bills of Rights are not only a constraint 
on the exercise of arbitrary power; they are also a positive instrument to enable 
relatively powerless groups to have an effective say in the democratic process.  
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Inclusive 
The process should place the highest premium on eliciting the views and 
experiences of groups whose human rights are most vulnerable to being breached, 
and should give those voices an elevated status in the assessment of responses and 
in the final outcome.  
 
Deliberative and participative 
The process should be an exercise in building citizenship, not merely ‘market 
research’. It should provide multiple opportunities for participation and, ideally, 
properly constructed forum(s) for deliberation which should be used to educate and 
invigorate the wider consultation.  
 
Educative 
The public should be informed to the greatest extent possible about existing human 
rights protections and options for building on them, and about their duty to respect 
the rights of others. A minimum requirement is the provision of accessible and 
impartial information and the correction of myths and misperceptions about human 
rights and the HRA. 
   
Reciprocal  
The process should be a two-way dialogue in which the government, too, is 
educated. The imprint of the process must be visible and acknowledged in the  
final outcome.  
 
Rooted in human rights 
The process of creating a Bill of Rights must be consistent with human rights 
principles. These include respect for the dignity and autonomy of individuals and the 
right to participation. These principles are internationally recognised and not subject 
to political whim or contingency; nor can they be trumped by considerations such as 
public safety or security or requirements to exercise individual responsibility.  
  
Timed  
Any process should have a clear timeframe with, at a suitable juncture, a momentum-
building phase. It should not be indeterminate.  
 
Symbolic 
The process should be suitably ambitious for the undertaking of a constitutional 
enterprise. A Bill of Rights that aspires to last for generations requires a process that 
is compelling to the public.   
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Designed to do no harm 
The process should be adequately resourced and there should be a political 
commitment to act on the outcome of consultation. A process is better not done at all 
than done badly. Disillusionment is contagious and corrosive; trust in the political 
process is fragile.   
 
Respectful of the devolution settlements 
Choice should reside with the devolved assemblies and the process should respect 
their competency and self-determination. 
 
Policy implications 
Pre-conditions for engagement 
The principles stated above are, to a degree, interdependent. However, the principle 
of non-regression is of a higher order. Without an unequivocal guarantee that the 
purpose of a Bill of Rights process is to augment international standards and to 
maintain their incorporation in domestic law, the other principles are likely to appear 
immaterial. We suggest that any actor concerned with the protection and promotion 
of human rights would be bound to reject a process predicated on regression in 
terms of formal endorsement or engagement.  
 
The corollary of this is that any future government must provide (and non-
governmental actors should demand) an unambiguous - and public - statement  
of intent and terms of reference for the consultation process, along with clear 
procedural commitments to act on the outcome of consultation within the  
stated parameters.  
 
Certifying non-regression 
Subject to these assurances, any future government should establish (and actors 
concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights should advocate for) an 
independent committee of experts, who might be appointed on a cross-party basis, to 
provide a ‘kitemark’ throughout the process that the principle of non-regression is 
being upheld.  
 
Designing process to produce an outcome with democratic legitimacy 
Any future government should, drawing from precedents in other jurisdictions, 
establish an independent body to run the consultation process. Contingent upon the 
assurances sought above, actors concerned with the protection and promotion of 
human rights should advocate for a consultative process that is run independently of 
government and designed to engender public trust.  
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The process must also be transparent: actors concerned with the protection and 
promotion of human rights should influence and monitor the process to ensure that 
any future government does not ‘pick and mix’ from available methodologies in order 
to manufacture apparent consensus behind measures which would not, in fact, have 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
Influencing the terms of debate: a concordat  
Actors concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights should  
advocate for a concordat that would bind all parties that signed it to certain rules of 
engagement; principally, an agreement not to use language or bring stories into the 
public domain that knowingly distort the purported impact of human rights and the 
HRA. This would help to ensure that all parties commit themselves to a process 
which is avowedly educative and non-partisan and does not trade in myths or seek to 
use the Bill of Rights as a proxy for unrelated issues.    
 
Devolution 
Actors concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights should 
champion the principle that choice should reside with the devolved assemblies and 
that the process of creating a UK Bill of Rights should respect their competency and 
self-determination. It is imperative that those actors with appropriate expertise and 
authority highlight the legal, constitutional and political implications of devolution  
for any decision to amend or repeal the HRA and/or to enact a UK or ‘British’  
Bill of Rights.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims of the report  
In October 2009, the Equality and Human Rights Commission commissioned Global 
Partners & Associates and the Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute 
at London Metropolitan University to undertake research to identify and explore best 
practice processes for developing a new Bill of Rights for the UK.  
 
The Commission has established a number of principles to guide its work relating to 
a Bill of Rights. These concern four issues: non-regression from the current levels of 
protection provided by the Human Rights Act (HRA);1 an appropriate and effective 
process for developing a Bill of Rights; the need actively to promote understanding of 
existing international and domestic human rights in any process; and the use by the 
Commission of the evidence and results from its Human Rights Inquiry2 to inform the 
development of any Bill of Rights and overarching human rights framework.  
 
In relation to the process for developing a Bill of Rights, the principles state that:   
 
• This government and any future governments should ensure that the process 
and result of developing any Bill of Rights involves and includes all sectors  
of society; creates a feeling of ownership in society as a whole; and allows  
for the consultation to be adequately resourced and conducted by an 
independent body. 
 
• In any Bill of Rights process, the government should actively promote 
understanding of the international treaties and better understanding of existing 
human rights. 
 
These principles were the starting point for this research, which aimed to: 
 
• analyse evidence drawn from related domestic and international experiences; 
 
• elaborate upon the Commission’s principles underpinning the development of a 
Bill of Rights; and 
 
                                                            
1  Any Bill of Rights should build on the HRA. Any Bill of Rights that replaces the HRA 
should not be brought into force until and unless it contains at least the same levels of 
protection of rights and mechanisms as under the Human Rights Act, and complies with 
obligations under international treaties. 
 
2  See http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/human-rights/human-rights-inquiry/ 
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• identify policy implications in relation to the development of a Bill of Rights, 
regardless of which political party is in power.  
 
1.2 Note on terminology  
 
What is a Bill of Rights?  
There is no fixed definition and the term is applied in practice to a diverse range of 
instruments, both constitutionally entrenched and non-entrenched, and statutory bills. 
Klug (2007: 4) describes Bills of Rights as:  
 
Part symbolism, part aspiration and part law … fundamentally a set of 
broadly expressed entitlements and values.  
 
Alston (1999: 10) suggests that they have three essential characteristics:  
 
• They provide protection for those human rights which are considered, at a given 
moment in history, to be of particular importance. 
 
• They are binding upon governments and can only be overridden with significant 
difficulty.  
 
• They provide some form of redress in the event that violations occur. 
 
Documents with these characteristics are also called a ‘charter of rights’ or, as in the 
UK, a ‘Human Rights Act’. Unless referring to a named instrument, this report uses 
the term Bill of Rights to refer to any document adhering to this broad definition.  
  
Consultation, deliberation and participation 
Consultation refers to a process intended to elicit the views or preferences of the 
public on an issue, with the aim of informing decision-makers – the citizen as 
‘sounding board’. Deliberation refers to a process that brings a random sample of 
citizens together to deliberate on public policy issues and reach considered 
judgements on the basis of balanced information – the citizen as decision-maker.  
 
Consultation processes may involve activity to educate or inform those being 
consulted; in practice, this happens with varying degrees of success. Deliberative 
techniques involve a more intensive learning phase and the provision of information 
reflecting competing perspectives.   
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A process is generally described as ‘participatory’ when it involves a significant 
proportion of those targeted and includes people who are considered hard to reach 
because of discrimination or disadvantage. The right to participate in public affairs is 
enshrined in several international human rights conventions3 and the United Nations 
has developed guidelines on what it means to exercise this right beyond voting 
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006: 14-16). Key principles are 
that people must be able directly to influence decisions that affect them and that their 
participation must be active and informed and must extend throughout the decision-
making process, from revealing preferences at the start to ensuring accountability for 
the impact of decisions.   
 
1.3 Context of the report 
Debate about a British Bill of Rights goes back some two centuries, but lay dormant 
until the 1960s when influential figures across the political spectrum endorsed it 
(Klug, 2007: 2). The idea of a Bill of Rights found a natural home with the Liberal 
Democrats (formerly the Liberal Party); the Labour and Conservative parties had a 
‘less positive and more spasmodic’ approach (Erdos, 2009: 21-22; Blackburn, 1999: 
Chapter 7).  
 
Nevertheless, in 1993, Labour endorsed A New Agenda for Democracy, which 
envisaged a HRA directly incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) into British law, to be followed by an entrenched, indigenous Bill of Rights 
(Labour Party, 1993: 29). Erdos (2009: 31-34) attributes the policy to Labour’s long 
spell in opposition under a Conservative administration widely perceived as illiberal 
and authoritarian, combined with sustained campaigning by groups such as Charter 
88 and the influence of senior Liberal Democrat figures. At this time, the terms 
‘Human Rights Act’ and ‘Bill of Rights’ were used almost interchangeably and were 
viewed as a single project (interview with Francesca Klug, Professorial Research 
Fellow at the London School of Economics, 13 January 2010). As Labour’s electoral 
prospects improved, support for the policy waned among the party leadership. The 
1998 HRA, which incorporated the ECHR into domestic law, was not entrenched.4 
                                                            
3 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
4  Section 4 of the HRA allows judges to signal incompatibility between primary legislation 
and the rights set out in the Act, while not permitting them to strike down legislation. Under 
section 3 of the HRA, judges are obliged to read and give effect to legislation in a way 
which is compatible with the ECHR ‘so far as it possible to do so’.  
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The HRA is widely referred to as a ‘Bill of Rights’, including by legal and 
constitutional commentators, UK government ministers and by actors in other 
jurisdictions who have sought to adopt the UK legislative model (Alston, 1999: 11; 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2008b: Ev 127; National Human Rights 
Consultation Committee, 2009: 263). The Act meets Alston’s authoritative criteria and 
was clearly designed as a higher law to which other law and policy should conform. 
Yet the HRA has failed to fulfil the symbolic requirements of a Bill of Rights: it has not 
been viewed by the UK population as ‘their bill of rights’ (Klug, 2007: 12, emphasis in 
original). This has been attributed to several factors. These include the lack of public 
engagement in the HRA’s creation, combined with the absence until 2007 of a 
human rights commission to promote understanding and implementation of it. Other 
factors are a lack of consistent government leadership (combined with ministerial 
discomfort at the challenge the HRA has sometimes posed to executive power); 
hostile and erroneous press reporting; and a political discourse which has at times 
distorted the purported impact of the Act (Donald et al., 2009: 178-81; Klug, 2007: 
12-14; Klug, 2009). 
 
Against this backdrop, in recent years all three major parties at Westminster have 
pledged to create a new Bill of Rights (while not, in the main, acknowledging that 
the HRA is widely considered to be one). The Labour government has consulted 
the public on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for the UK; the consultation was 
launched with the publication of a Green Paper on 23 March 2009 and was due to 
close on 26 February 2010. The Labour government is committed to the HRA, 
including both the rights and freedoms enshrined in it and the mechanisms used to 
implement those rights (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 58). The Conservatives have 
pledged to repeal the HRA and replace it with a ‘modern British Bill of Rights’ 
(Cameron, 2006). Repealing the HRA would mean that the ECHR would no longer 
be incorporated into domestic law; the Conservative Party has not indicated 
whether, or how, a future Bill of Rights might incorporate the ECHR using a 
different mechanism. The Liberal Democrats are committed to a written 
constitution with, at its heart, a Bill of Rights which would strengthen and entrench 
the rights guaranteed in the HRA (Liberal Democrats, 2009). The position of the 
parties is presented in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
The research comprised: 
 
• A review of literature on Bills of Rights (and analogous) processes, focusing on 
five common-law jurisdictions: Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Australia 
and Northern Ireland. 
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• Forty-three semi-structured interviews with people who have studied and/or 
been involved in either (i) processes to create Bills of Rights in the UK and 
internationally or (ii) processes undertaken for other purposes that might hold 
relevant lessons. See Appendix 1 for a list of interviewees. 
 
• A seminar on 1 December 2009, held under Chatham House rules, which 
involved representatives of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Scottish Human Rights 
Commission; legal practitioners; academics from a variety of disciplines; non-
governmental organisations (NGOs); and advocacy groups.  
  
1.5  Guide to the report 
Chapter 2 gives a narrative account of the processes that created Bills of Rights (or 
proposed Bills) in common law jurisdictions outside Britain. Chapter 3 provides a 
comparative analysis of these experiences and identifies the methods and 
approaches which have been - or might be - used in any future process. Chapter 4 
examines the position of the main UK political parties on creating a new Bill of Rights 
and public attitudes to, and understanding of, human rights legislation. Chapter 5 
examines the legal, constitutional and political implications of devolution for any Bill 
of Rights project. Chapter 6 presents key principles which the author suggests should 
underpin any UK process to create a Bill of Rights or against which the process might 
be scrutinised. Chapter 7 outlines the policy implications of these principles and the 
evidence presented in Chapters 2 to 5. 
DEVELOPING A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UK 
2. Bills of Rights processes  
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to Bills of Rights in common law jurisdictions 
outside Britain, the context in which they emerged and the processes that created 
them. It examines the emergence of the idea of participation as both a right and a 
necessity to produce a document with democratic legitimacy. This chapter should be 
read in conjunction with Chapter 3, which offers an analytical and comparative 
assessment of these experiences.  
 
Bills of Rights outside Britain  
Some of the best-known Bills of Rights (or proposed Bills) were part of a reframed 
constitutional settlement following conflict, revolution or political upheaval (France, 
the United States, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and international Bills of Rights 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention  
on Human Rights). Elsewhere, national human rights instruments were the product  
of considered political debate about the value of such legislation in a modern 
democracy (Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the UK Human Rights Act or HRA).  
 
Bills of Rights form a spectrum of rights protection. At one end is the US model of 
constitutional supremacy which entrenches fundamental rights as ‘supreme law’. At 
the other is legislative supremacy which gives primacy to parliamentary sovereignty. 
Each model is vulnerable to criticism - the former for displacing democratic politics in 
favour of judicial power, the latter for putting human rights at the mercy of transient 
legislative majorities (Gearty, 2006: 60-98). The Bills of Rights explored in this 
chapter sit at different points along the spectrum. Most involve some form of 
constitutional dialogue between judicial and legislative institutions - a ‘middle ground’ 
that strikes a balance between parliamentary sovereignty and an elevated status for 
rights (Leane, 2004: 174).  
  
Participation as a right and a necessity 
A characteristic of the more recent processes to develop Bills of Rights (Australia and 
Northern Ireland) has been the premium placed on public participation and not solely 
elite negotiation. Harvey (2001) notes that there are principled and pragmatic 
reasons for this approach:  
 
The principled reason is that deliberation is always an essential aspect of 
reflective law and policy formation in a political community … The 
pragmatic consideration is that if … the Bill of Rights is to assume the 
exalted status of the ‘sacred’ text in a secular society then its shape (not 
6 
 
BILLS OF RIGHTS PROCESSES 
simply the choice to accept or reject it) must be determined by a broadly 
based process of popular participation. 
 
Hart (2003: 12) places Bills of Rights within a broader post-war trend towards 
‘process-driven constitutionalism’. She suggests that participation has emerged as 
both a right and a necessity in the formation of constitutional documents. The United 
Nations treaty body monitoring civil and political rights recognises a specific right to 
participate in choosing or changing a constitution (Committee on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1996, para 6). Further, Hart (2003: 12) argues that:  
 
Process has joined outcome as a necessary criterion for legitimating  
a new constitution: how the constitution is made, as well as what it  
says, matters. 
 
Similarly, Nedelsky (2008: 162) argues that in order to justify constitutionally 
entrenched rights as constraints on democratic decision-making ‘the processes by 
which [rights] are defined must themselves be universally recognised as legitimate’.  
 
While the right to participation is becoming established in law and theory, the means 
of realising that right in the formation of Bills of Rights is a matter of experimental 
practice. The rest of this chapter gives a narrative account of the processes 
undertaken in five common-law jurisdictions. These experiences are analysed 
comparatively in Chapter 3.  
  
2.2  Canada  
The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was the ‘magnificent obsession’ 
of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, and the centrepiece of his project to ‘patriate’ the 
constitution (that is, to make it amendable by Canada only, with no role for the UK 
parliament) (interview with Peter Russell, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at 
the University of Toronto, 9 November 2009). Canada already had a non-entrenched 
Bill of Rights enacted in 1960, which applied only to federal law as it lacked the 
requisite provincial consent. Trudeau saw the Charter as a way of forging a source of 
Canadian values and unity in the face of separatist tendencies in Quebec (JUSTICE, 
2007: 99). Quebec rejected the Charter as a centralising mechanism; other provinces 
were won over by a clause which gave them a way of temporarily overriding certain 
Charter rights. Leane (2004: 155) notes that the Charter was essentially a top-down 
process driven by elite negotiation:  
 
… the creature of a highly motivated Prime Minister and often reluctant 
Premiers of the various provinces, but never ‘of the people’.  
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There was one avenue by which human rights experts and interest groups were able 
to influence the content of the Charter. A special all-party committee was created, 
and spent around 90 hours discussing the Charter, all filmed for television. It listened 
to some 300 presentations from groups representing women, aboriginal people, 
disabled people, ethnic and cultural minorities and others. The committee also 
considered 1,200 written submissions. From these, it made 123 recommendations to 
strengthen the Charter - more than half of which were included in the final 
document.5  
 
Peter Russell, who advised the committee, noted that the purpose of the hearings 
was not to accept or reject the Charter or to discuss the principles that underlay it:  
 
It was clear we were going to have a Charter of Rights … the point of the 
consultation was to influence the detail.  
(interview, 9 November 2009) 
 
Despite the lack of public engagement, the Charter remains popular: a survey in 
2007 found that almost six in 10 Canadians believe the Charter ‘is moving our society 
in the right direction’ (Nanos, 2007: 51). However, respondents displayed low levels 
of understanding about the content of the Charter and the mechanisms that make  
it work.  
 
2.3  New Zealand  
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) was a partisan measure promoted 
by the Labour government in its pre-election manifesto, promoted without the support 
of the (then) opposition or most members of the Labour government itself, and with 
minimal public engagement (Joseph, 1999: 283). BORA followed unsuccessful 
moves in 1985 to create a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights similar to the 
1982 Canadian Charter. A Justice and Law Reform Select Committee of Parliament 
held hearings over two years and analysed more than 400 submissions, the majority 
of which focused on the controversial issue of abortion rights. Submissions 
suggested that there was minimal public support for an entrenched Bill (Glazebrook, 
2004: 2). Support was also lacking from the ruling Labour Party and from the legal 
profession; the Law Society described the proposed measure as ‘legislating by 
bumper sticker’ in its use of slogans which were vague and open to interpretation 
(interview with Paul Rishworth, Dean of the University of Auckland Faculty of Law, 9 
December 2009). Opposition to the 1985 Bill centred on fears that entrenchment was 
undemocratic and risked politicising the judiciary. In 1990 - and with little additional 
public consultation - BORA was enacted as ordinary legislation with subordinate 
                                                            
5  See www.charterofrights.ca 
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status which can be overridden by a simple majority in the unicameral parliament 
(Leane, 2004: 171).  
 
Sylvia Bell, Principal Legal and Policy Analyst at the New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission, observed that BORA has been characterised as a ‘rogue’s charter’, a 
perception she attributed partly to the lack of public engagement in its creation and  
a paucity of efforts to promote understanding of it (interview, 17 November 2009). 
Nevertheless, there have been no moves to repeal the legislation and it has not 
proved to be as weak and inconsequential as many supposed (Joseph, 1999: 283; 
Paul Rishworth interview, 9 December 2009).  
  
2.4 South Africa 
The process of developing South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution and Bill of 
Rights took place in two phases. The first was a partly closed process of negotiation 
between former adversaries which lasted from 1990-94 and resulted in agreement on 
an interim constitution including an entrenched Bill of Rights (Chanock, 1999; Hart, 
2003: 8; Sarkin, 1999). The agreement included binding requirements that an elected 
constitutional assembly must, within two years and after wide consultation, draft a 
final constitution and Bill of Rights according to principles agreed during the 
negotiations (JUSTICE, 2007: 8). 
 
Hugh Corder, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Cape Town, was one of 
the four-person technical committee that drafted the interim Bill of Rights; he stated 
that members were instructed not to talk to the media or the wider public, though they 
were influenced by informal lobbying (interview, 21 October 2009). This was followed 
by an ‘exaggerated’ public consultation process in the second phase from 1994-96.  
 
In this phase, the constitutional assembly - made up of the parliament and the senate 
- engaged in a massive publicity exercise to encourage the public to submit ideas on 
the new constitution. This included a media and advertising campaign; an assembly 
newspaper with a circulation of 160,000; comic books; mass meetings; and an online 
forum. More than two million submissions were received and estimates suggest that 
the campaign reached more than two-thirds of the population (Hart, 2003: 8). Debate 
about economic and social rights percolated up strongly from grassroots discussion, 
including whether such rights should constitute a minimum core of entitlements or a 
wider social aspiration (interview with Geoff Budlender, a South African barrister and 
acting High Court judge, 21 October 2009). 
 
The four biggest petitions, reflecting Afrikaner opinion, were to keep the death 
penalty; for the right to bear arms; to make Cape Town the capital, and to retain 
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Afrikaans as a privileged language. None was included in the final Bill of Rights. 
Hugh Corder noted that the outcome of the process was ‘politically determined and 
anything not acceptable was simply ignored’. However, he added, public campaigns 
were successful in resisting efforts by the African National Congress to exclude from 
the Bill the right of access to information and the right to administrative justice 
(interview, 21 October 2009).  
 
The South African experience stands apart from the others reviewed here. The  
Bill of Rights process was part of an exercise in state-building with a transformative 
purpose and was politically controlled by a party with the mindset of a liberation 
movement (Geoff Budlender interview, 21 October 2009). South Africa’s story bears 
some comparison with the transitional context in Northern Ireland. Further, South 
African jurisprudence has been influential in convincing some UK politicians that it is 
possible to give legal effect to social and economic rights (Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (JCHR), 2008a: 48-51). However, the unique circumstances in post-
apartheid South Africa make it difficult to draw conclusions about the process that 
might be applicable in a settled democracy such as the UK.  
 
2.5 Australia  
Since 2002, five Australian states and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have 
conducted inquiries into how human rights could be better protected. In Victoria, 
Tasmania, Western Australia and ACT, the inquiries were conducted by independent 
committees, all of which recommended the adoption of some kind of Bill of Rights. 
ACT and Victoria have taken action; ACT passed the Human Rights Act 2004 and 
Victoria passed the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. 
Tasmania and Western Australia deferred action pending the outcome of a National 
Human Rights Consultation. This was completed in September 2009 and 
recommended the adoption of a federal HRA similar to the model in ACT and 
Victoria. In Queensland and New South Wales, inquiries were conducted by 
parliamentary committees; both rejected legislation and recommended other 
measures to protect and promote human rights.  
 
Here, we examine the processes in ACT, Victoria, Tasmania, Western Australia and 
at the federal level.  
 
ACT  
In April 2002, the ACT Labor government appointed a consultative committee to 
inquire into a possible Bill of Rights for the territory with broad, non-prescriptive terms 
of reference (Byrnes et al., 2009: 75). Hilary Charlesworth, Professor of Law at the 
Australian National University, chaired the committee. She noted that, lacking any 
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models to work from, the committee ‘started from first principles’ in devising an  
eight-month programme of community consultation (interview, 2 November 2009).  
 
As outlined in ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee (2003), activities included:  
 
• the distribution of a pamphlet to all households; 
 
• the establishment of a web page and dedicated telephone line; 
 
• the distribution of an ‘issues paper’, leading to consideration of 145 
submissions; 
  
• meetings with the public and specific community groups; 
  
• public lectures and seminars; and 
 
• a deliberative poll involving 200 randomly selected residents (see section 3.7)  
  
Hilary Charlesworth (interview, 2 November 2009) reflected that the committee failed 
adequately to engage with three key audiences: business, the media and public 
servants. The response of senior bureaucrats to the committee’s report ‘ranged from 
indifference to cynicism to outright hostility’ (Byrnes et al., 2009: 77).  
 
Hilary Charlesworth added that civic education efforts were limited by a lack of 
responsiveness from, among others, schools and by a lack of resources. Town hall-
style meetings were sometimes sparsely attended. Another lesson learnt was the 
need to work through community representatives and specialist groups in order to 
reach individuals and communities who do not normally engage with such processes 
– a lesson acted on by the Victoria and federal consultation committees.  
 
Some two-thirds of those who responded to the consultation favoured a statutory  
Bill of Rights. Informed by this, the committee recommended a non-entrenched  
HRA similar to the UK model (ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, 2003).  
The primacy of socio-economic rights in community discussions led the committee  
to include in its draft legislation most of the rights in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as those in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
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The ACT government rejected the inclusion of socio-economic rights. It also rejected 
the committee’s proposal for an express duty on public authorities to comply with the 
Act and the provision of a legal remedy for breach of this duty.  
 
Victoria 
In April 2005, the Victorian Labor government established an independent Human 
Rights Consultation Committee to lead a community consultation about whether 
Victorian law should be changed to protect human rights more effectively (Victorian 
Human Rights Consultation Committee, 2005a). In contrast to the broad terms of 
reference of the ACT committee, the Victorian government issued a detailed and 
prescriptive Statement of Intent, setting out its favoured model for a Bill of Rights very 
similar to the ACT HRA (Department of Justice, Victoria, 2005). Economic and social 
rights were thus excluded, as were new individual causes of action based on human 
rights breaches.   
 
The Victorian committee was influenced by the ACT process, but adapted to a larger 
scale (Byrnes et al., 2009: 112). It was also informed by preparatory meetings with 
interested parties held before the public consultation was launched (Victorian Human 
Rights Consultation Committee, 2005a: 141).  
 
Rather than holding drop-in town hall-style meetings, which had mixed success in 
engaging the public in ACT, the Victorian committee held targeted meetings with 55 
small groups and community associations across the state. The committee also 
pioneered the use of ‘devolved consultation’, working in partnership with specialist 
and community groups to speak directly to specific groups within the community who 
were marginalised from formal methods of consultation or who needed support to 
take part.  
  
Informed by the hostile response among public servants to the ACT HRA, the 
committee held a parallel process involving 75 consultations with, among others, the 
Victorian government and its agencies, parliament, the judiciary and the police.  
  
The Victoria process was structured around 10 key questions (see Appendix 3).  
The questions formed the basis for a widely circulated community discussion paper 
(Victorian Human Rights Consultation Committee, 2005b) and a variety of printed 
and online materials (in 10 languages and accessible formats) which were distributed 
to more than 600 organisations from culturally and linguistically diverse communities. 
Specific materials were developed for target audiences, including teaching materials 
for secondary schools (Victorian Human Rights Consultation Committee, 2005a:  
141-43).  
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In total, the committee received 2,524 formal submissions – most, in the assessment 
of the committee chair, ‘from people who had never before made a written 
submission to any public process’ (Williams, 2006: 892). Of these, 84 per cent 
supported change to better protect human rights in Victoria (rising to 94 per cent 
when informal petitions were included), with an overwhelming majority favouring a 
charter (Victorian Human Rights Consultation Committee, 2005a: 145-46). Around  
40 per cent supported the inclusion of economic and social rights, compared with  
95 per cent support for the inclusion of civil and political rights (Victorian Human 
Rights Consultation Committee, 2005a: 27). 
 
After a six-month process, the committee recommended a Draft Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities which was enacted by the state parliament with minor 
changes. The Charter excludes economic and social rights; only those rights with 
majority support were included (Williams, 2006: 897). However, the legislation 
provides for a mandatory review by 2011, during which the Victorian Attorney-
General ‘must cause’ a review to examine matters such as whether additional human 
rights, including rights contained in the ICESCR, should be included.  
 
Tasmania 
In February 2006, the Tasmanian Labor government asked the Tasmania Law 
Reform Institute to investigate options for human rights protection, especially whether 
Tasmania should have a Bill of Rights. The Institute was assisted by an independent 
Human Rights Community Consultation Committee (Byrnes et al., 2009: 141).  
 
The Tasmania consultation was on a smaller scale than its predecessors and took 
only three months. It was focused around an Issues Paper (Tasmania Law Reform 
Institute, 2006) which was circulated through community, advocacy and professional 
networks, with a ‘quick response sheet’ for submissions. The committee held 66 
community consultation meetings, including with people who might otherwise have 
been marginalised from the process. It placed particular emphasis on meeting people 
with learning difficulties face-to-face (Tasmania Law Reform Institute, 2007). 
 
The process generated 407 submissions (a higher per capita response than in either 
ACT or Victoria); 94 per cent supported a Bill of Rights. The Institute recommended a 
format similar to the ACT HRA and Victorian Charter, but went further in 
recommending the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights. It stated that 
excluding these rights spoke of ‘timidity rather than rationality’ (Tasmania Law 
Reform Institute, 2007: 122). The Tasmanian government has indicated that it will 
await the outcome of the federal consultation before responding to the report (Byrnes 
et al., 2009: 142).  
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Western Australia 
In May 2007, the Western Australian Labor government announced a community 
consultation on a HRA for the state, to be led by an independent committee. As in 
Victoria, the government issued a prescriptive Statement of Intent. However, it 
deviated from earlier models by releasing a draft Human Rights Bill to serve as a 
focus for the community consultation and to indicate the government’s preferred 
model (Byrnes et al., 2009: 142). 
  
The committee invited responses to a community discussion paper in printed, 
electronic and audio form, which focused around eight key questions similar to those 
in Victoria (see Appendix 4). Of 377 submissions, 50 per cent favoured a HRA. A 
public opinion survey commissioned by the committee to reflect the ‘silent majority’ 
showed stronger support, with 89 per cent favouring a law to protect human rights 
(Byrnes et al., 2009: 142-43).  
 
The committee held 39 public meetings in metropolitan and rural areas around the 
state – a ‘travelling human rights roadshow’ (Consultation Committee for a Proposed 
WA Human Rights Act, 2007). Meetings were also held with, among others, 
representatives of religious faiths and minority ethnic communities, parliament, the 
media, the police union, the legal profession, industry, local government and 
government departments. 
 
As in Victoria, the committee organised devolved consultations. More than 400 
people were consulted from groups in the community which could be considered 
‘marginalised, isolated and at risk’ or their advocates.  
 
A former Liberal federal parliamentarian and minister Fred Chaney, who chaired the 
committee, argued that its priority was to insulate the process from the charge of 
talking only to the already converted: 
 
The really important thing was to stop the process being dominated by 
academics and lawyers - I wanted to get down to the bedrock.  
(interview, 23 November 2009) 
 
The committee recommended changes to the Human Rights Bill to reflect community 
concerns: the most significant was the addition of certain economic and social rights 
and the establishment of a complaint and conciliation system to deal with human 
rights breaches by government agencies, in addition to court remedies (Byrnes et al., 
2009: 143). The Western Australian Human Rights Bill was put on hold pending the 
outcome of the federal consultation; the election of a Liberal government in 2008 
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makes it doubtful that the Human Rights Bill will be revived imminently (Byrnes et al., 
2009: 143). 
  
National Human Rights Consultation 
Australia is rare among democratic nations in not having a comprehensive form of 
legal protection for basic rights (Williams, 2006: 883). Debate has proceeded 
sporadically since Federation. Successive attempts to introduce a Bill of Rights 
foundered on the twin fears that it would encroach on the legislative powers of the 
states and that it would be incompatible with Australian parliamentary democracy, or 
simply unnecessary (Byrnes et al., 2009: 23-43; Williams, 2006: 883-85). In 2005, a 
civil society-led campaign was initiated with the sponsorship of the online magazine 
New Matilda. Support coalesced around a draft ‘New Matilda Bill’ which drew 
explicitly on the human rights conventions and declarations ratified by Australia. 
From 2008, the campaign was relaunched as the Human Rights Act for Australia 
Campaign.6  
 
That year, the new Labor government fulfilled an election pledge to conduct a 
nationwide consultation, run by an independent National Human Rights Consultation 
Committee (NHRCC), with the aim of finding out: 
 
• which human rights and responsibilities should be protected and promoted in 
Australia; 
 
• whether human rights are sufficiently protected and promoted; and  
 
• how Australia could better protect and promote human rights.  
 
These otherwise open-ended terms of reference were prescriptive in one key regard: 
constitutional entrenchment of any human rights legislation was ruled out.  
 
As stated in NHRCC (2009: 4-9), throughout its seven months of public consultation 
the committee:  
 
• invited submissions by email, an online form or post; 
 
• held 66 community roundtables around the country, with attendances of up to 
250 people; 
 
                                                            
6  See www.humanrightsact.com.au  
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• held an online forum for discussion of the three primary consultation questions 
and the question of whether or not Australia needs a HRA, which attracted 
almost 9,000 users;7 
 
• commissioned a national telephone survey and focus group research using 
qualitative and quantitative methods to gauge the views of a random sample  
of Australians; 
 
• commissioned focus group research to obtain the views of marginalised groups 
who might otherwise be excluded;  
 
• commissioned an analysis of the economic and social costs and benefits of 
various options available;  
 
• held three days of public hearings in Canberra to air competing perspectives; 
 
• hosted Facebook pages; and 
 
• organised an online discussion of human rights on the Australian Youth Forum 
website. 
 
The question of whether Australia should have a Bill of Rights was not expressly 
stated in the committee’s terms of reference. However, largely as a result of 
energetic pro-HRA campaigns, the vast majority of submissions addressed this 
question (NHRCC, 2009: 5-6). 
 
As in the state-level processes, the committee placed a high premium on face-to-face 
contact with urban and rural communities across Australia and made particular use of 
local media and local MPs to publicise community meetings. The federal committee 
also commissioned devolved consultations to obtain the views of groups who would 
otherwise be excluded from the process.  
 
The committee submitted its report to the federal government in September 2009. 
The entire process had taken 10 months, after a two-month extension to deal with 
the volume of submissions. The committee recommended a federal HRA, which was 
supported by more than 87 per cent of those who made submissions and expressed 
a view on the issue. It recommended an Act broadly consistent with the Victorian and 
ACT legislation (NHRCC, 2009: 377-78). It proposed that if economic and social 
                                                            
7  See http://www.openforum.com.au/NHROC 
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rights are included, these should not be directly enforceable through the courts 
(NHRCC, 2009: 365-66). It further recommended a range of measures to strengthen 
human rights protection in the areas of education, auditing, parliamentary scrutiny 
and compliance (NHRCC, 2009: 352-61).  
 
At time of writing in February 2010, the Australian government has not responded to 
the consultation committee’s report.  
 
2.6  Northern Ireland 
 
Developing advice to the UK government  
The 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement provided for a Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission (NIHRC) with a mandate to:  
 
... consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster 
legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, 
drawing as appropriate on international instruments and experience.  
(NIHRC, 2008: 8) 
  
In December 2008, the NIHRC presented its detailed advice on a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland to the UK government (NIHRC, 2008). The intervening decade saw 
an extensive process of public consultation on the Bill of Rights led by the NIHRC 
and involving a wide range of other actors. According to Catherine Donnelly, the 
Principal Legal Adviser to the NIHRC on the drafting of a Bill of Rights, this protracted 
consultation was ‘an organic, pragmatic and reactive process rather than one framed 
at the start’ (interview, 30 November 2009).  
 
The consultation was launched in March 2000. There followed a year of activity to 
canvas views on the Bill of Rights. As noted in NIHRC (2001, 2005), this included:  
 
• Training sessions and the production of a manual and video for some 400 
potential facilitators to enable them to spread awareness of the Bill of Rights 
consultation within their own communities or organisations.  
 
• The establishment of nine advisory Working Groups; these operated 
independently from the NIHRC and submitted reports to it on: children and 
young people, criminal justice, culture and identity, education, equality, 
implementation issues, language, social and economic rights and victims’ rights. 
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• The production and wide distribution of 11 thematic pamphlets. 
 
• Targeted consultations with community-based groups of women and children 
and young people. 
 
• Numerous public and private meetings with political parties, interest groups and 
community organisations; conferences and workshops.  
  
Informed by more than 200 submissions, in September 2001, the NIHRC published a 
consultation document setting out its preliminary views on a draft Bill of Rights 
(NIHRC, 2001). This was promoted in an advertising campaign on television, radio, 
billboards and bus-shelters. There was also a second round of the ‘training for 
facilitators’ programme, and other educational and promotional work carried out 
jointly with civil society networks such as the Human Rights Consortium, which was 
formed in 2000 to promote community engagement. A children’s coordinator was 
appointed to gather the views of 1,350 children and young people. By March 2002, 
more than 600 formal submissions had been received since the start of the process 
(NIHRC, 2005: 12-14).  
 
Responses to the consultation document revealed party political fault lines that were 
to persist throughout the process (NIHRC, 2004a: 8-9). Unionist parties argued that 
the NIHRC had exceeded its mandate by recommending rights that would not be 
protected elsewhere in the UK. Nationalist parties stated that the NIHRC’s proposals 
might undermine existing equality guarantees in Northern Ireland as opposed to 
building on the models that already existed. An associated complaint by nationalist 
parties was that the NIHRC had not given sufficient focus to guaranteeing parity of 
esteem for the Catholic and Protestant communities, one of the fundamental 
principles of the Good Friday Agreement. This concern was shared by two founding 
Commissioners, who resigned from the NIHRC in 2002; they also expressed 
frustration about, among other issues, the lack of powers and resources that had 
been made available to the NIHRC.8  
 
In April 2004, the NIHRC responded to the criticisms in a further consultation 
document (NIHRC, 2004a). This presented the result of an opinion poll in which 
almost 70 per cent of those expressing an opinion said that a Bill of Rights reflecting 
the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland was either essential or desirable 
(NIHRC, 2004a: 145-48; NIHRC, 2004b). Support for a Bill of Rights was indicated by 
                                                            
8  See 
http://www.nihrc.org/index.php?Itemid=65&category_id=2&page=press_news_details&pre
ss_id=136 
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both main communities (65 per cent of Protestants and 73 per cent of Catholics). 
There were higher rates of approval among both communities for the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights. The poll was consistent with two earlier surveys in 1999 and 
2001.9  
  
Despite this apparent cross-community support, political consensus had still not been 
achieved, either on the nature of a Bill of Rights or the need for one. At the same 
time, the NIHRC was experiencing instability as four more Commissioners had 
resigned, leaving only two. The NIHRC declined to submit final advice in advance of 
their being replaced (NIHRC, 2005: 5). Instead, in February 2005, the NIHRC stated 
that a forum comprising political parties and civil society representatives under an 
international chairperson would be the best means of promoting the eventual 
adoption of a comprehensive Bill (NIHRC, 2005: 4). The UK government had first 
committed itself to establishing a forum in 2003. The St Andrews Agreement of 
October 2006, which restored devolution to Northern Ireland after a four-year 
suspension, finally provided the necessary cross-party support (Bill of Rights Forum, 
2008: 5).  
 
The Bill of Rights Forum was tasked with making recommendations to the NIHRC on 
the content of a Bill. It consisted of 14 members of civil society and 14 political 
representatives. It had a part-time independent chair, the Australian human rights 
lawyer Chris Sidoti (Bill of Rights Forum, 2008: 5-6). 
 
The Forum agreed that its processes would be based on four operational principles: 
openness, transparency, inclusiveness and accessibility (Bill of Rights Forum, 2008: 
7-8). Meetings were open to the public, including the media. The Forum committed 
itself to proceeding as much as possible through consensus and agreed that all 
proposals for the Bill of Rights discussed by the Forum would be included in its 
report, even if they conflicted (Bill of Rights Forum, 2008: 8). Its initial deliberations 
took place in seven working groups looking at: children and young people; civil and 
political rights (including equality); criminal justice and victims; culture, identity and 
language; economic and social rights (including equality); preamble, enforcement 
and implementation; and women. 
 
The Forum also developed an outreach strategy to, among other aims, consult 
sectors or groups identified as not having been sufficiently engaged in the earlier 
consultation process. The Forum seconded four part-time outreach workers, but 
delays in appointing them and clarifying their role meant the Forum could not 
                                                            
9  See http://www.borini.info/opinion-polls.aspx 
19 
 
DEVELOPING A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UK 
undertake even the limited consultation originally envisaged (Bill of Rights Forum, 
2008: 8-9).  
  
The Forum handed its recommendations to the NIHRC in March 2008. The report 
states alongside each recommendation the level of support or dissent it received 
from Forum members. The Forum was unable to come to a single view on many 
issues, including how to interpret its own terms of reference.  
 
In June 2008, the NIHRC published the methodology for preparing its own advice on 
a Bill of Rights (NIHRC, 2008: 177-80). This comprised a set of guidelines to inform 
deliberations on the possible contents of its advice. These included whether the 
proposed right arises out of the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland; whether 
it is supplementary to, and compatible with, the HRA and ECHR, and not already 
adequately protected; whether it is line with international best practice and 
experience; and whether it reflects the principles of mutual respect and parity of 
esteem between the two main communities. The Commission held a further round of 
meetings with political parties and civil society to receive feedback on the 
methodology (NIHRC, 2008: 13).  
 
Informed by the Forum’s recommendations, its own extensive consultations and this 
methodology, the NIHRC submitted its advice to the UK government in December 
2008. The NIHRC did not draft a Bill of Rights but rather a series of 
recommendations specific enough to provide clear direction. Each of the proposed 
rights is explained and justified with reference to the methodology. Among the rights 
recommended for inclusion are economic, social and cultural rights, children’s rights, 
victims’ rights and environmental rights. 
 
The Northern Ireland Office consultation 
In November 2009, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) published its consultation 
paper, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Next Steps (NIO, 2009); the consultation 
was due to close on 1 March 2010. The NIO consultation document focuses on  
rights which, in the government’s view, ‘can be argued to reflect the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland and the principles of mutual respect for the identity 
and ethos of both communities’ (NIO, 2009: 21). Only two of the rights recommended 
by the NIHRC were accepted by the government for inclusion: the right to vote/be 
elected and the right to identify oneself and be accepted as British or Irish or both. 
The NIO stated that social and economic rights are common across the UK and 
should be addressed as part of the consultation on a UK Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities, rather than solely in relation to Northern Ireland (NIO, 2009: 19-20). 
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Other rights and enforcement issues are either discarded or left open  
for consultation.  
 
The Human Rights Consortium has described the document as ‘pitifully limited’ and 
‘disrespectful’ (Irish Independent, 2009). Some interviewees expressed concern  
that the three-month NIO consultation risks failing to engender a sense of public 
ownership of the process in Northern Ireland and is not adequate for a constitutional 
enterprise of such significance. Further, they suggested that the year-long delay in 
launching the NIO consultation had dissipated momentum. A senior official at the 
NIO stated that it would be difficult to extend the process beyond the standard 
duration for government consultations given the proximity of a general election 
(interview, 19 January 2010). The official added that the time taken to issue the 
document reflects the breadth and complexity of the advice document. 
 
The UK parties’ positions on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and the relationship 
between the processes at the UK level and in Northern Ireland are considered in 
Chapter 5.  
 
2.7  Conclusion 
Bills of Rights in the modern era differ from each other in their provenance and the 
processes used to create them. All have been fundamentally based on, or strongly 
influenced by, international human rights treaties. They have not emerged in isolation 
from each other: the South African and New Zealand drafters looked to Canada; the 
Northern Ireland drafters looked to South Africa, Canada and Australia; the 
Australian drafters looked to all of these and to the UK HRA. In this sense, Bills of 
Rights may be viewed as a global collaborative project in which different jurisdictions 
have incorporated or built upon international human rights standards and adopted, or 
adapted, legislative models and processes developed elsewhere. 
 
As JUSTICE (2007: 98) notes, consultation processes have steadily grown ‘in their 
breadth, inclusiveness, sophistication and general effectiveness’. Yet whether - and 
how - democratic legitimacy is secured in the process of creating a Bill of Rights is a 
matter of experimental practice. The case studies available to us are too few and too 
recent to permit definitive conclusions about which methods are most likely to 
generate a sense of public ownership for the final outcome; some offer negative 
rather than positive examples of how to create a Bill of Rights. Further, methods of 
achieving participation may legitimately vary according to the context. Chapter 3 
analyses the experiences narrated above to provide some comparative insights that 
span the different jurisdictions. 
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3.  Securing democratic legitimacy 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines some common themes emerging from the diverse experience 
of post-war Bills of Rights processes. A good starting point is provided by the 
reflections of George Williams, who chaired the Victorian consultation committee, 
about the challenge of designing a Bill of Rights process:  
 
I felt strongly the real danger of introducing a major democratic reform that 
had not been preceded by a significant period of consultation and 
engagement … that led me to believe that one of the key principles had to 
be that an instrument of this type had to come with a high level of popular 
ownership; it had to be generated by a very inclusive process to give the 
outcome legitimacy and the process also really had to ground itself in 
everyday concerns so that the law would reflect – and be seen to reflect – 
community concerns.  
(interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
What constitutes ‘significant’ engagement? What makes a process ‘inclusive’?  
How might process ensure the ‘legitimacy’ of the outcome? Here, we analyse how 
different processes have responded to these questions and whether their 
approaches are context-specific or offer more general insights.  
 
3.2  Going forwards, not backwards 
Some of the processes we examined in Chapter 2 were elite-led (Canada and  
New Zealand); others were more participatory (Australia and Northern Ireland)  
or, over time, a hybrid of the two (South Africa). However, they share a common 
characteristic: all have been designed to supplement existing human rights 
protection, and/or to incorporate international human rights into domestic law, and/or 
to strengthen mechanisms and institutions for protecting human rights.  
 
The Canadian Charter of 1982 built upon the 1960 Bill of Rights, itself largely based 
on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 expressly affirmed New Zealand’s commitment to the 
ICCPR. The South African Bill built upon the Canadian Charter, the ICCPR and the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR). Bills of Rights 
which have been enacted or recommended in Australia have drawn explicitly on the 
ICCPR and in some cases the ICESCR and on models of enforcement from 
jurisdictions including the UK. 
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Most interviewees suggested that national Bills of Rights derive an essential element 
of their legitimacy from their explicit or implicit foundation in international human 
rights treaties. The ACT consultation committee recognised this in their strategy to 
ensure that the federal government, which was then strongly opposed to Bills of 
Rights, would not exercise its constitutional power to override the ACT HRA: 
 
We made sure the proposal stuck very closely to the ICCPR, so the 
[federal] government would find it harder to override it.  
(Hilary Charlesworth interview, 2 November 2009) 
 
None of the processes under review permitted even the possibility of regression 
either in terms of standards or mechanisms and institutions for protecting human 
rights. The way in which governments initiated reform, either through a draft bill 
and/or through the terms of reference or mandate established for a participatory 
process of consultation, expressly excluded this option (even if, in some cases, 
maintenance of the status quo was at least a theoretical option).  
 
For example, the mandate behind the creation of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
was to identify rights ‘supplementary to the European Convention’ (NIHRC, 2008: 8, 
my emphasis). The Chair of the Bill of Rights Forum in Northern Ireland, Chris Sidoti, 
stated that it was a ‘bottom line’ of the Forum’s process that it should not weaken or 
be inconsistent with international human rights obligations or their existing means of 
domestic enforcement in the Human Rights Act (HRA) – and that this should be 
clearly explained to the public: 
 
It was necessary to articulate this clearly right at the start because 
international law is remote and people don’t always have a sense of 
ownership over it.  
(interview, 26 November 2009) 
 
In South Africa, one of the constitutional principles specified in the Interim 
Constitution (to which the final constitution had to conform) required that  
‘[e]veryone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil 
liberties’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, Schedule 4, 
Principle 2). 
 
The terms of reference of the Australian National Human Rights Consultation 
Committee were to:  
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... report to the Australian Government … on the issues raised and the 
options identified for the Government to consider to enhance the 
protection and promotion of human rights.  
(Attorney-General’s Department (Australia), 2008, my emphasis) 
 
For its part, the Victorian government stated that the primary purpose of community 
consultation was to: 
 
... identify those mechanisms that will strengthen Victorians’ enjoyment 
of their democratic rights and the institutions that protect those 
rights. (Department of Justice, Victoria, 2005, my emphasis) 
 
Defining certain areas as non-negotiable might be seen as conflicting with the 
principle of democracy. George Williams noted that in recommending significant 
reform such as a Bill of Rights, the question always needs to be asked   
 
How will that reform be assisted - or not - by the openness of the terms of 
reference and will there be any lingering questions of illegitimacy? 
(interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
However, interviewees overwhelmingly understood the democratic imperative as 
requiring not a ‘blank sheet’ in which all possible options are given equal 
consideration - including that of going backwards - but rather transparent terms of 
reference. These should state clearly the parameters of the discussion in relation to 
existing human rights protections and international obligations.  
 
In all Bills of Rights processes, building on existing standards and mechanisms rather 
than going backwards has been one of those parameters. This trend in the way that 
governments have initiated reform is consistent with the principle of non-regression – 
a principle established by, among others, United Nations bodies that monitor states’ 
compliance with their international human rights obligations. This requires that 
standards for the protection of the individual that have already been adopted should 
not be undone at a later date (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
1990: para 9). This principle has gained cumulative force as successive jurisdictions 
have, building on each other’s experience and on the international human rights 
treaties, enacted national Bills to strengthen human rights protection.  
 
Moreover, the principle of non-regression goes to the heart of the relationship 
between human rights and democracy. Ian O’Flynn, Lecturer in Political Theory at 
the University of Newcastle, argued that human rights are constitutive of democracy: 
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Bills of Rights are not merely negative instruments to constrain authoritarian 
governments and the suppression of minorities. They are also: 
 
... positive instruments to enable minorities to have a more effective say in 
the democratic process and hence to play their part in shaping the polity 
as a whole. 
(interview, 27 October 2009)  
 
There is no trade-off, then, which might justify the weakening of human rights 
protection on the grounds that it expresses the majority will. Rather, the democratic 
imperative is to construct a process which provides ample opportunities for groups 
whose rights are most likely to be abused to participate; mechanisms for achieving 
this are considered in section 3.6.  
 
3.3   Statements of intent 
Section 3.2 established that no Bill of Rights process has been entirely open-ended 
in the options it was prepared to consider. However, some were more open-ended 
than others. In this section, we analyse how governments have constrained the 
options put forward for public consultation and the implications that this might have 
for the legitimacy of the resulting document. 
 
Interviewees recognised that all Bills of Rights processes are necessarily constrained 
by what is considered legally and politically feasible in terms of the possible 
substantive outcome(s). However, there were differences of emphasis about how 
these constraints should be managed. Some favoured a clear statement of intent 
from government about what options it favours, since it is disempowering and 
distracting for people to be consulted about outcomes which are politically 
unattainable. Others favoured casting the net more widely to encompass options  
that do not necessarily have elite support, with the only ‘non-negotiable’ being  
non-regression from existing standards and mechanisms for protection.  
 
A comparative analysis shows how these differences of emphasis have played out in 
different contexts. 
 
The national process in Australia excluded the option of constitutionally entrenching a 
Bill of Rights. Frank Brennan, who chaired the process, argued that it was a 
reasonable decision:  
  
Interfering with federal-state relations wouldn’t have got past first base 
politically. So the prior question is, ‘what are the immovable political 
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parameters?’, and for those to be stated upfront and for the committee to 
consider only options in accordance with those parameters. 
(interview, 20 November 2009)  
  
However, other interviewees criticised the decision to foreclose this option. Chris 
Sidoti considered that the case for constitutional entrenchment should have been 
considered as part of the process:  
 
Desirably, possibilities should not be closed off, even though pragmatically 
there is a need to recognise that every possibility may not be realistic or 
attainable in the short term. 
(interview, 26 November 2009)  
 
Conversely, the Australian process has also been criticised for posing questions that 
were too open-ended. This resulted, according to Edward Santow, the Director of the 
Charter of Human Rights Project at the University of New South Wales, in ‘a 
conversation with the community that lacked structure’ (interview, 26 October 2009).  
 
Edward Santow suggested that another benefit of asking more structured questions 
and proposing draft models for reform:  
 
The merit of this process is that it gives the community a clearer idea of what 
they’re giving their opinions about and it can also reduce political game-
playing that might happen if no one knows where the [process] is headed. 
(interview, 26 October 2009)  
  
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) process was entirely open-ended in the 
questions it asked the public, though the clear political context was the government’s 
willingness to enact some form of Bill of Rights. Hilary Charlesworth considered that 
the unconstrained nature of the public debate influenced the resulting 
recommendations and ensured they reflected the flavour of discussions at 
community level. Specifically, it was ‘very good to be able actively to consider a more 
constitutional route’ even though, on balance, the committee was swayed by 
arguments for a statutory model. Further, although the government rejected the 
committee’s recommendation to include socio-economic rights, Hilary Charlesworth 
stated that:  
 
... being allowed to consider economic, social and cultural rights … was 
really important … Almost everything people said was very much tied to 
[these] rights … I was really glad not to have to rule them out. 
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(interview, 2 November 2009) 
 
In Victoria, the government’s Statement of Intent ruled out the possibility of including 
economic and social rights. Some people, especially in the community sector, argued 
that the statement was too prescriptive and could be seen as prejudging the 
consultative process (Williams, 2006: 887). However, the chair of the committee, 
George Williams, notes that the government’s prescriptions did not constrain 
community discussions in practice:  
 
While the Consultation Committee asked members of the community 
open-ended questions that sought responses far broader than the 
preferences in the Statement of Intent, it was useful when people asked 
where the Government stood to be able to provide a specific response.  
(Williams, 2006: 887)  
 
In the event, the government provided for a review of the Victorian Charter by 2011 
to determine, among other things, whether it should be expanded to include 
economic and social rights; this gives proponents of such rights a four-year period in 
which to make the case for their inclusion (Williams, 2006: 897). Phil Lynch of the 
Human Rights Law Resource Centre argued that the Victorian consultation 
committee’s willingness to listen to community deliberations, despite its prescriptive 
terms of reference, shows the value of a more open-ended approach:   
 
The government was initially interested only in [civil and political] rights. 
They were pushed further than that by the weight of community 
engagement … This was a direct impact of the process – it effected a real 
shift in the debate. 
(interview, 16 November 2009)  
 
At the same time, George Williams (2006: 887) emphasises that the Statement of 
Intent was valuable in signifying the government’s endorsement of a Bill of Rights 
and the political will to implement its favoured model if the committee found it had 
popular support. The Victorian process, then, combined relatively unconstrained 
community discussion with an unambiguous commitment from the government to act 
within certain parameters. 
 
Northern Ireland presents a contrasting experience. Reflecting on the decade-long 
process, interviewees concurred that it had been protracted and indeterminate. This 
was partly due, some interviewees suggested, to the lack of clarity at the outset on 
the timeframe, procedure, mandate and terms of reference of both the Bill of Rights 
27 
 
DEVELOPING A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UK 
Forum and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC); these were 
contested throughout, preventing progress on substantive issues (Catherine Donnelly 
interview, 30 November 2009; Chris Sidoti interview, 26 November 2009). Also 
lacking was a clear procedural commitment from the UK government about what 
action would be taken after the NIHRC presented its advice. Brice Dickson, Professor 
of International and Comparative Law at Queen’s University, Belfast, suggested that 
the UK government’s delay in taking almost a year to respond to the NIHRC’s advice 
had caused the process to ‘fall into disrepute’ (interview, 9 November 2009). Another 
interviewee noted: 
 
Before you even step into this arena you need to tie down more carefully a 
clear line about what happens afterwards because there’s a real danger of 
creating expectations among communities that are vulnerable and 
marginalised - and in Northern Ireland some of those communities are 
already disillusioned with the rhetoric of the peace process. 
 
This observation goes to the heart of the integrity of participatory processes to create 
Bills of Rights. Pulling together the strands of debate considered in this section, 
human rights lawyer Phil Lynch argued that: 
  
It is disempowering for people to be asked questions in which their 
answers will have no influence … So, do one thing or the other: if there is 
a limited number of possible outcomes, there’s no point debating 
outcomes that fall outside those parameters. If there’s a genuine desire to 
obtain the community’s views, then ask open-ended questions that do not 
presume any particular outcome.  
(interview, 16 November 2009) 
 
Graham Smith, Professor of Politics at the Centre for Citizenship, Globalization and 
Governance at the University of Southampton, added that meaningful engagement 
tends to come around contested areas such as socio-economic rights. A key aspect 
of process, then, is to identify areas where interest groups and the political elite do 
not agree and put these at the heart of the process:  
 
A general approach of ‘fill in the blank, what should a bill of rights be?’ 
would be an enormous mistake. It is better to engage people on the areas 
of greatest controversy - the things that actually make a difference.  
(interview, 9 November 2009)  
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Most interviewees suggested that transparency about the political purpose of a Bill of 
Rights ‘project’ and the options that a government considers feasible is paramount. 
Chris Sidoti added that a body independent of government ‘is in a good position to be 
open and honest about these realities’ (interview, 26 November 2009). It is to this 
question of who runs the consultation process that we turn next. 
 
3.4  Running the consultation 
In Australia, most Bills of Rights processes were run by independent committees. 
The Northern Ireland process was run by a human rights commission, with a 
significant role for the separate Bill of Rights Forum. The more limited public 
participation in Canada and New Zealand took place in parliamentary hearings. In 
this section, we compare these approaches in terms of their success in building trust 
and engagement and insulating the process from being undermined or manipulated 
by political interests.  
 
The independent committee model 
Most of the Australian committees comprised four people, nominated on a cross-
party basis. Most were not human rights experts, with the exception of the committee 
chairs in Victoria and ACT. The chair of the Western Australia consultation 
committee, Fred Chaney, was a former Liberal politician whose party has 
consistently opposed Bills of Rights. The federal committee included a prominent 
broadcaster, a former police officer specialising in counter-terrorism and an 
indigenous barrister, with a Jesuit priest and lawyer, Frank Brennan, as chair. None 
publicly held a position about the desirability of a Bill of Rights; the committee was 
‘genuinely agnostic’ (Chris Sidoti interview, 26 November 2009). The Victoria 
committee included a basketball player; the ACT committee, a poet. Some 
interviewees were uncomfortable about the idea of appointing committee members 
primarily for their public profile. Most also said that it was important for the committee 
to include at least one member with human rights expertise so that it was not wholly 
reliant on external legal advice.   
 
Interviewees familiar with the Australian experience were unanimous in endorsing the 
independent committee model and considered the principle of independence to be 
transferable to other contexts. Previous inquiries into a Bill of Rights for Australia 
were run by parliamentary committees with a clear government majority, which were 
seen as having a vested interest in the outcome and failed to convince the public or 
sceptical politicians. Spencer Zifcak, Director of the Institute of Legal Studies at the 
Australian Catholic University, noted that:  
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There is no point giving [the process] to a body that is not independent, 
that has a pre-determined agenda. 
(interview, 14 December 2009)  
 
Chris Sidoti added that the perception of independence increases the prospect of the 
resulting recommendations being seen as legitimate:  
  
The credibility of the process has to be designed right up front … human 
rights are a highly emotive issue [and] attract a high level of irrational 
responses … so it’s far better for such a consultation to be undertaken by 
a group of ‘clean skins’. 
(interview, 26 November 2009) 
 
Throughout the federal process, the committee was attacked by the anti-HRA 
Murdoch-owned press for being, as Frank Brennan put it, ‘like-minded people with 
pre-conceived notions’. He added:  
 
This was nonsense. We were four people with quite different and 
disparate experiences and views but who shared a genuine commitment 
to improving the rights of people who ‘fall through the cracks’ in the 
Australian context … and over time we developed a credibility of 
connectedness to local communities. 
(interview, 20 November 2009) 
 
Further, he added, the independence and diversity of the committee bolstered the 
credibility of its final report:  
 
It was precisely because the committee did not have unanimity … that 
guaranteed the integrity of the processes we followed including the report 
writing … It could have been a more focused report with clearer lines if 
there had been a clearer position earlier on; but in terms of the long-term 
validity of the exercise it was a very good thing that the committee was 
divided until the very end of the process. 
 
One challenge faced by the national committee was the difficulty in establishing 
dialogue with senior officers of federal government departments (other than the 
Attorney-General’s Department which hosted the committee’s secretariat). 
Occasional meetings with an inter-departmental committee made up of middle-
ranking officials were no substitute for ‘being able to eyeball senior bureaucrats’, and 
Frank Brennan suggested that: 
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We were talking about getting ideas off the ground that would impact 
primarily on Commonwealth public servants in terms of delivery of 
services so it was a very significant shortcoming ... This will make things 
problematic in terms of implementation [because] if it’s not practical it 
doesn’t matter how firmly based we think it is in principle. 
(interview, 20 November 2009) 
 
However, interviewees did not consider this an inherent weakness of the 
independent committee model: such obstruction had not been experienced in other 
processes. For example, in Victoria, an inter-departmental committee was 
established to shadow the community-level process and to have input before the 
committee drafted its report. George Williams argued that this ensured an outcome 
‘that not only had broad community support but which could be implemented 
effectively and at the lowest cost’ and that enjoyed a greater sense of ownership 
among public servants (Williams, 2006: 890).  
 
Human rights commissions 
A review of the Northern Ireland process reveals the particular difficulties facing a 
human rights commission charged with leading a consultation process on a Bill of 
Rights. One interviewee noted that the NIHRC’s role had created suspicion among 
some communities that a ‘maximalist approach was intended from the start’. Smith 
(2006: 918) sees the experience of the NIHRC as a ‘stellar illustration’ of the 
challenges facing all national human rights institutions, which must carve out a space 
between government and civil society and remain independent of government while 
being reliant on state funding.  
 
The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) saw its primary role in the federal 
consultation as providing information about human rights and appropriate tools to 
support public engagement. The AHRC took no formal role in the consultation and, 
like the consultation committee, was ‘conscious of the need to keep a healthy 
separation’ (interview with Kate Temby, Acting Director Human Rights Unit, AHRC, 
26 November 2009). The AHRC had also played a role in brokering competing 
viewpoints, for example by organising a roundtable of constitutional lawyers to 
consider the implications of a national HRA.  
 
Interviewees overwhelmingly agreed that human rights commissions are not the right 
institutions to run a consultative process on a Bill of Rights since they will inevitably 
be seen as having a vested interest in the outcome. Rather, interviewees suggested 
that the role of a human rights commission was to influence the design of the process 
and monitor its implementation; advocate for key principles, including non-regression; 
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promote a participatory approach; coordinate responses and generate community 
engagement; take a leading educational role; and speak authoritatively about human 
rights with particular attention to ‘myth-busting’.  
 
Government or parliament  
No interviewee favoured public consultations on a Bill of Rights being run by a 
government department or solely by a parliamentary committee. As Phil Lynch noted, 
a government-run exercise: 
 
... presents problems of accountability to political masters and can easily 
be seen as compromised.  
(interview, 16 November 2009)  
 
Some interviewees noted that both governmental and parliamentary processes tend 
to be more conventional and static in their methods than an independently run 
process and significantly less able to generate community engagement and 
enthusiasm. Such processes are also more vulnerable to becoming a proxy for other 
political battles than in the relative ‘safe haven’ of an independent exercise.  
 
In New Zealand, the government-sponsored process engaged the public only 
minimally and, partly as a result of this, the Bill of Rights Act remained ‘abstract and 
remote’ to the public (Sylvia Bell interview, 17 November 2009). 
 
Peter Russell, who advised the Canadian parliamentary committee during the 
Charter of Rights process, said that submissions by interest groups experts did much 
to strengthen the Charter (interview, 9 November 2009). However, it was an elite-led 
process in which only national organisations with ‘political clout and good legal 
counsel’ were able to get a hearing; community-based groups and individuals were 
effectively excluded. He added that a better process would have been to have a ‘real 
political conversation about the Charter of Rights, with the public much more involved 
than it was in Trudeau’s package’.  
 
3.5  Political consensus  
The premium placed on achieving political consensus around a Bill of Rights varies 
with the political context. Constitutional reform of any kind is generally perceived as 
requiring substantial political consensus, since partisan initiatives are unlikely to 
achieve legitimacy or longevity. In South Africa and Canada, Bills of Rights were 
emblematic documents developed in the context of significant constitutional moments 
and gained acceptance in part by being firmly rooted in international human rights 
treaties.  
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Statutory Bills of Rights developed in settled times have rarely achieved cross-party 
consensus: the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was a controversial and partisan 
measure. In Australia, the conservative Liberal Party has consistently opposed  
Bills of Rights processes initiated by Labor administrations at federal and 
state/territory level.   
 
In Australia, the consultation committee expended considerable effort in meeting 
politicians from all sides and saw it as a success that the Shadow Attorney-General 
made a formal submission to the committee on behalf of the opposition parties rather 
than standing aloof from the process (Frank Brennan interview, 20 November 2009).  
 
A further question arises in relation to process: how should it seek to build political 
consensus if this is lacking at the outset?   
 
Northern Ireland is a salient example, given the conflicted context in which the Bill of 
Rights process took place. Interviewees suggested that it was unrealistic to expect 
the NIHRC to achieve cross-party consensus. One argued that:  
 
There was no express requirement in the mandate to achieve consensus 
around the proposals … Ultimately if you ask a human rights commission 
to do this, all you can really expect … is that it will provide you with good, 
solid human rights advice. If your dominant concern is party political 
consensus, then give it to a body that is set up to do that.  
 
The Bill of Rights Forum in Northern Ireland was set up primarily as a space for 
political negotiation and not as a body for public consultation, though it came under 
pressure from some quarters to fulfil both roles (Chris Sidoti interview, 26 November 
2009). Some interviewees acknowledged that the Forum learned some difficult 
lessons. It had been set up too late in the process; it was inadequately resourced 
(requiring a full-time chair and a bigger secretariat) and it had too little time for 
preparation and educational groundwork with those attending.  
 
Most interviewees agreed that the Forum could not have achieved political 
consensus whatever its methods: politicians knew that the ‘endgame’ when final 
deals would be struck had not yet been reached. Despite this, the Forum’s chair, 
Chris Sidoti, stated that it played a ‘very valuable role’ (interview, 26 November 
2009). Other interviewees also praised the Forum as a model: it had increased the 
knowledge and understanding of key decision-makers, overcome some political 
obstructions and established precisely where agreement and disagreement lay. It 
had also provided an arena for politicians to be challenged by community groups to 
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defend their position, educating all players in the process. Moreover, the structure  
of the Forum ‘demanded participation’ of its members since parties were inevitably 
reluctant to surrender the seats they had been allocated; skilful chairing had also 
‘kept people in the room’ despite the political fissures.  
 
Chris Sidoti suggested that the Forum could provide a useful model for a Bill of 
Rights process outside the Northern Ireland context: 
 
There is value in having, parallel to a broad public consultation or 
subsequent to it, this kind of political process, on neutral ground, to thrash 
out areas of agreement and perhaps overcome political blockages. 
(interview, 26 November 2009) 
 
Some interviewees pointed to other models for seeking consensus. The European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights was formed of heads of state and national and 
European parliamentarians, with civil society groups able to monitor and shape 
proposals. It used an ‘iterative consensus-seeking’ approach in which successive 
drafts were debated at periodic intervals until little or no opposition remained 
(Deloche-Gaudez, 2001: 23).  
 
Another model is that of the constitutional convention. One precedent is the Scottish 
constitutional convention which helped design the framework for devolution.10 It was 
initiated by civil society groups and consisted of some political parties, churches, 
trade unions and other sectoral groups. The convention established a Constitutional 
Commission; its purpose was to develop proposals for, among other issues, the 
electoral system and how a Scottish Parliament might operate. Convention members 
spent several months debating the Commission’s recommendations within their own 
organisations, before negotiating a consensus on the key issues. Another precedent 
is the Australian Constitutional Convention of 1998 which debated the best model for 
a republic; this was formed of 152 delegates, half popularly elected and half 
government appointees.  
 
In terms of UK precedents for considering broader constitutional reform, JUSTICE 
(2007: 95-96) notes that a convention of citizens, interest groups and 
parliamentarians offers an alternative to either a royal commission, a specially 
appointed select committee or a constitutional assembly of both Houses of 
Parliament. A constitutional convention has not been a feature of any Bill of Rights 
process outside the UK and it is beyond the scope of this report to evaluate this 
                                                            
10  See http://www.almac.co.uk/business_park/scc/scc-
rep.htm#The_Scottish_Constitutional_Convention 
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model in detail. Some interviewees noted that specially convened assemblies 
involving political parties and civil society are not assured of achieving cross-party or 
social consensus. An interviewee in Australia suggested that the convention on a 
republic was justifiably criticised for being dominated by the ‘usual suspects’ and 
failing sufficiently to engage or educate the wider public. An interviewee in Scotland 
observed that the convention on devolution had been useful for generating ‘social 
buy-in’, though it did not escape partisan controversy as the Conservative and 
Scottish National Parties boycotted it.  
 
In summary, the achievement of political consensus is not reducible to this or that 
model of consultation. It is dependent also upon the nature of the constitutional 
‘moment’ and on having champions in the legislature and (as in Canada) on 
sustained political leadership. Nor is cross-party consensus, desirable as it may be, 
necessarily synonymous with public legitimacy. Forums for negotiation must co-exist 
with consultative bodies that engender trust by being demonstrably non-partisan and 
by employing participatory methods of engaging the public.  
 
3.6  Consultation  
As noted in Chapter 1, there is a distinction between ‘consultation’, an exercise in 
finding out the views or preferences of citizens, and ‘deliberation’, a process by 
which, typically, a random sample of citizens conducts informed discussion of a 
policy question and reaches a considered judgement. Both require an educative 
component since there is no value – and potential harm - in people expressing views 
on matters they do not understand.  
 
All Bills of Rights processes have been primarily consultative rather than deliberative.  
 
In this section, we analyse who is consulted and how, including the role of civil 
society. In section 3.7, we examine the (potential) value and impact of deliberative 
techniques. The main focus is on methods used in Bills of Rights processes; 
however, we refer also to consultative and deliberative methods used for other 
purposes that might yield relevant insights.  
 
Who to consult 
A hallmark of the Australian and Northern Ireland experiences was the imperative to 
‘engage the unengaged’ rather than elite groups and those already motivated and 
equipped to make submissions. This involved eliciting opinions and experiences from 
specific groups identified as socially excluded or disadvantaged – and, more broadly, 
from disaffected communities alienated from the political and legal system. George 
Williams, who chaired the Victorian process, recalled that:  
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I said upfront that I didn’t want to talk to the human rights groups – they’re 
well educated and can look after themselves. I wanted to speak to victims’ 
rights groups, farmers, people who feel disconnected from the issue.  
(interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
In a comparable process in 2004, the New Zealand Human Rights Commission 
consulted broadly on its strategic Action Plan which established priorities for 
protecting and promoting human rights. The Commission adopted a deliberate 
strategy of recruiting people from communities identified as marginalised to help run 
the consultation; this included street children, asylum seekers and refugees, and 
people with mental illness. Joanna Collinge, the Executive Director of the 
Commission, stated that: 
 
We were aware of the need to reach the silent majority who normally 
wouldn’t contribute to a public submissions process … We also wanted to 
get at the marginalised voices within the marginalised communities, such 
as the women in migrant groups.  
(interview, 7 November 2009)  
 
Some interviewees stated that outreach should also target powerful interests who 
might assume the process is irrelevant to them, such as corporations. Success was 
patchy with this audience in Australia (Hilary Charlesworth interview, 2 November 
2009). However, the early endorsement of a human rights charter by 
telecommunications firm Telstra was influential in the national debate (Telstra, 2009; 
Edward Santow interview, 26 October 2009).  
 
How to consult: the relationship with civil society 
We have seen that the Australian processes sought to ensure that interest groups did 
not monopolise debate about a Bill of Rights. Yet in Australia and elsewhere civil 
society organisations have greatly influenced consultation processes. This has 
happened in two distinct ways: civil society groups have been subcontracted as 
direct partners by bodies running consultations to engage ‘hard-to-reach’ groups; 
they have also played a broader lobbying and mobilising role.  
 
Devolved consultation 
Processes in Victoria, Western Australia and at the federal level in Australia used 
‘devolved consultations’ – described by one interviewee as a ‘spectacularly 
successful’ way of reaching individuals who would otherwise have been unlikely to 
participate (Edward Santow interview, 26 October 2009). This involved working in 
partnership with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community groups and 
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specialist networks such as community law centres, youth councils and frontline 
service providers systematically to facilitate hundreds of conversations with  
such individuals.  
 
At the national level, the devolved consultations were run by a research company.  
In Western Australia, they were carried out by a consultant, guided by a reference 
group from the community sector. In Victoria, the consultative committee directly 
subcontracted community-based groups to promote discussion in their sector. In 
each case, community and advocacy groups that had relationships of trust with the 
targeted groups were involved in the conversations.  
 
Target groups for devolved consultation included: prisoners or ex-prisoners; people 
with drug or alcohol dependency; homeless people; single mothers; people living with 
AIDS; people on low incomes; people with mental health problems; people with 
physical and/or learning disabilities; indigenous people; people from culturally and 
linguistically diverse backgrounds; recently arrived refugees, immigrants and people 
recently released from immigration detention; and older people (Consultation 
Committee for a Proposed WA Human Rights Act, 2007: Appendix F; National 
Human Rights Consultation Committee (NHRCC), 2009: 13; Victorian Human Rights 
Consultation Committee, 2005a: 165-67).  
 
Phil Lynch ran some devolved consultations with homeless people in Victoria as  
the then Coordinator of the Public Interest Law Clearing House (PILCH) Homeless 
Persons’ Legal Clinic in Melbourne. He explained that each workshop involved  
10-15 people and was facilitated by a lawyer and someone who was homeless or 
formerly homeless who had received training in human rights and facilitation. 
Discussion was pitched in terms meaningful for that group, such as the rights to 
housing and health and to be treated with dignity and respect. Each workshop had  
an open-ended session which recorded people’s views and experiences and a 
session which supported people to make individual submissions: a questionnaire  
with ‘tick box’ options and sections where people could tell their story. The end result, 
Phil Lynch noted, was around 100 individual submissions and an organisational 
submission from the legal clinic bolstered by ‘real, human content’ (interview,  
16 November 2009).  
 
The devolved consultations influenced both the tone and content of the committees’ 
final reports and, according to Spencer Zifcak, made them more persuasive  
to government:  
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Individual experiences of disadvantage are a basis for sounder 
recommendations and to indicate to government that there are  
real problems. 
(interview, 14 December 2009) 
 
Frank Brennan also identified this aspect of process as having been indispensable:  
 
People have got to see the human face, they’ve got to be able to paint the 
picture of the lived experience, where people are falling through the cracks 
and what are the issues of significance to them.  
(interview, 20 November 2009) 
 
Frank Brennan suggested that one lesson learnt from the federal experience was 
that consulting groups considered vulnerable is time-consuming, especially where 
ethical clearance is required by academic researchers. This might require devolved 
consultations to start before the wider public consultation. 
 
Some interviewees in Northern Ireland said that the programme of training facilitators 
had been an important part of the process. Another initiative was the Bill of Rights 
mentoring project run by the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI).  
This supported mentors and related training for community groups in order to extend 
their knowledge of, and interest in, the Bill of Rights process (CFNI, 2007).  
 
These initiatives to leverage community networks in order to invigorate Bills of Rights 
processes show the importance of engagement with civil society by those running the 
consultation process. Some interviewees stated that this needed to start well before 
the public consultation in order that NGOs could influence the design of the process 
and prepare to involve their own constituencies.  
 
Lobbying and mobilising 
In Australia and Northern Ireland, NGO networks have been vibrant and influential 
throughout the process.  
 
In Australia, around 25,000 of the more than 35,000 submissions sent to the 
committee were generated through campaigns by Amnesty and a coalition called  
Get Up! (NHRCC, 2009: 5-6).11 Amnesty circulated a simple tick-box postcard in 
universities and schools. It also developed an online submission form which gave 
drop-down options relating to particular rights and space for people to narrate their 
                                                            
11  See http://www.amnesty.org.au/ and http://www.getup.org.au/campaign/rights/407 
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experiences. Jenny Leong of Amnesty Australia argued that new media campaigns 
were especially important in engaging a young audience: Amnesty used Twitter, 
Facebook and blogs to keep supporters updated. She stated that: 
  
Many people think they are not expert enough to participate in such a 
consultation so we gave people the tools to do that.  
(interview, 11 November 2009) 
 
Also influential were the Charter Group in Victoria and the Australian Human Rights 
Group at (AHRG) at federal level.12 The AHRG was formed several months before 
the consultation – partly to ensure that the process happened. It subsequently 
provided advice to the consultation committee and assisted individuals and 
organisations to make submissions.  
 
In Northern Ireland, an ad hoc Human Rights Consortium was established in 2000  
to encourage community involvement. It grew into a coalition of more than 100 
community groups, NGOs and trade unions campaigning for a ‘strong and inclusive’ 
Bill of Rights. Its activities have included research, education, lobbying, roundtables 
between civil society groups and politicians, and, in 2008, a publicity campaign to 
raise awareness about the Bill.13 During 2006-08, other independent organisations 
consulted on a Bill of Rights: these included the CFNI and the Northern Ireland 
Council for Ethnic Minorities.14 
 
Civil society networks have played a significant role in energising and informing 
debate on Bills of Rights, both as campaigners and as direct partners in the 
consultation. It is too early to make a final assessment of their impact as they are still 
instrumental in lobbying for implementation of recommendations for Bills of Rights: 
their role both precedes and outlasts that of the ‘official’ consultation.   
 
How to consult: the choice of methodology  
Methods used in Bills of Rights processes have included consultation documents 
inviting submissions on paper or online; online discussion forums; opinion surveys; 
focus groups; public hearings; ‘town hall’ meetings; and more targeted conversations 
with community groups.  
 
                                                            
12  See www.humanrightsact.com.au/ahrg/ 
 
13  See http://www3.billofrightsni.org/ 
 
14  See http://www.communityfoundationni.org/news/default.asp?ID=9&itemId=75&va=1 and 
http://www.nicem.org.uk/bill-of-rights 
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Interviewees emphasised the need for the process to offer multiple opportunities  
and spaces to participate. It was also ‘exceptionally important to mix qualitative with 
quantitative methods’ to insulate the process from allegations of being confined to a 
self-selecting audience (Chris Sidoti interview, 26 November 2009). Frank Brennan 
suggested that the multi-stranded nature of the Australian process increased  
its credibility:  
 
We were always aware that those who came to community meetings were 
likely to have a grievance or personal agenda, so it was also important to 
have rigorous independent research to capture general opinion and 
significant resources were put into this.  
(interview, 20 November 2009) 
 
The more recent processes in Australia have used social networking and other online 
forums, email and text messaging to energise debate and generate submissions. 
Each consultation committee had a website and most developed online submission 
forms. At the federal level, the committee and its chair each had a Facebook page, 
while an online forum facilitated by legal experts responded to questions about the 
consultation. In Victoria, information on how to access the community discussion 
paper was distributed by email to tens of thousands of people using community and 
NGO networks. In Western Australia, an online discussion forum, email and text 
messaging were used to consult with hard-to-reach groups to supplement meetings 
in person. Future Bills of Rights processes may wish to consider other innovations 
which use information technology to engage citizens, including those with little or no 
knowledge of the internet (Smith, 2005: 90-104). Examples in the UK include 
anonymous and secure discussion forums, ‘Womenspeak’ (for survivors of domestic 
violence) and ‘HeadsUp’15 (for young people). Smith (2005: 104) notes that these 
were an effective means of garnering the views and experiences of groups that 
would be highly unlikely to engage effectively with public officials via conventional 
means.  
  
Several interviewees in Australia pointed to the impact of the three days of public 
hearings in Canberra, which attracted significant national media attention. These 
were televised and webcast and were ‘very valuable for public accountability and 
transparency’ (Phil Lynch interview, 16 November 2009). The hearings involved more 
                                                            
15  See http://www.headsup.org.uk/content/  
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than 60 pro- and anti-HRA speakers and tackled, among other themes, the ‘hot 
button’ issues of same-sex marriage, euthanasia, abortion and religious freedom.16 
 
Interviewees gave mixed views on the value of opinion polls. Some considered them 
a valuable supplement to qualitative methods. Others highlighted the risk of relying 
on polls to provide a gauge of public opinion. For example, opponents of a Bill of 
Rights in Northern Ireland had ‘been able to shoot holes’ in this aspect of the process 
because of the necessarily simplistic nature of the questions asked (Brice Dickson 
interview, 9 November 2009). By contrast, deliberative techniques are less 
vulnerable to the charge of superficiality.  
 
3.7 Deliberation  
Although as noted above, all Bills of Rights processes have been primarily 
consultative rather than deliberative, there is a growing body of theory and practice in 
deliberative methods that focus on the quality and form of the engagement between 
citizens in participatory forums (Involve and the National Consumer Council, 2008; 
Runswick, 2007; Smith, 2005). Of particular interest are ‘micro-forums’ that select 
participants by forms of statistical or random sampling to ensure their 
representativeness and design a safe environment where they can deliberate on the 
basis of balanced information (Smith, 2005: 40). These vary in their format and scale, 
from citizens’ juries of a dozen people to the ‘America Speaks’ initiative where 5,000 
citizens are linked via networked computers (Smith, 2005: 48-52). In this section, we 
focus on deliberative polling, which has been used in one Bill of Rights process, and 
citizens’ assemblies which some interviewees suggest offer a useful model to 
consider for future processes.  
 
Deliberative polling 
Deliberative methods were not used in any Bill of Rights process except in ACT, 
where a deliberative poll aimed to ‘facilitate the informed voice of ACT citizens’ 
(Issues Deliberation Australia, 2002: 6). Some 200 randomly chosen ACT residents 
were polled on their initial views on issues relating to a Bill of Rights. They later held 
two days of deliberation, during which they were exposed to competing views and 
were able to question speakers. They were polled again to measure changes in their 
opinions. The independent organisers also measured the gains in the knowledge 
base of those taking part. In common with most deliberative polls, the results 
reported by Issues Deliberation Australia (2002: 2-3) showed statistically significant 
changes in views: 
                                                            
16  See 
http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/CalendarofEvents_Pu
blicHearings 
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• Prior to the deliberation, 47 per cent of participants favoured a Bill of Rights; this 
grew to 59 per cent afterwards. Those opposed also grew, from 29 per cent to 
39 per cent, with fewer undecided. 
 
• Initially, 72 per cent favoured an entrenched Bill; after deliberation, this fell to 
around 40 per cent.  
 
• Following their deliberations, participants’ knowledge base increased by 
between five and 50 per cent.  
  
The event was broadcast in edited form on television and attracted news media 
attention. The consultative committee’s recommendations reflected the final view of 
the deliberative poll in proposing a statutory HRA. Committee chair Hilary 
Charlesworth argued that the deliberative poll was the most successful aspect of the 
ACT process: 
 
It was quite remarkable that there was quite a strong swing [towards a Bill 
of Rights] once people had been educated … I learnt a great deal and it 
made me really focus on the big questions in people’s minds. 
(interview, 2 November 2009) 
 
The drop in support for an entrenched HRA is a reminder that the constitutional 
model, viewed by its proponents as the pinnacle of human rights protection (Gearty, 
2006: 69) is not necessarily assured of popular support – a trend that was repeated 
in other Australian processes.  
  
Citizens’ assemblies 
The pre-eminent example of a citizens’ assembly is that established by the 
government of British Columbia in 2004 to review the province’s voting system.17 The 
assembly was empowered to propose a new voting system to be put to referendum 
should it conclude that change was needed. Warren and Pearse (2008: 1) note that 
the assembly:  
 
... represented the first time in history that ordinary citizens have been 
empowered to propose fundamental changes to political institutions to 
their fellow citizens.  
 
The assembly was carefully designed to be ‘insulated from the distortions and bias of 
political debate in mass democracies’ and from direct manipulation by politicians 
                                                            
17 See http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public 
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(Warren and Pearse, 2008: 17). It consisted of 160 randomly selected citizens (a 
man and a woman from each district), with an independent chair and a secretariat. 
Two aboriginal representatives from the larger random sample were added because 
the final selection had resulted in insufficient representation from that group. The 
assembly met regularly over a period of 11 months to learn about different electoral 
systems and discuss their relative merits. Warren and Pearse (2008: 11-12) show 
that the process involved three phases: 
 
• The learning phase: intensive education of assembly members about electoral 
processes, including questioning of expert witnesses.  
 
• The public hearing phase: members held public hearings, attended community 
events and received more than 1,400 public submissions.  
 
• The deliberative phase: members designed an electoral system that maximised 
the values they rated most highly. 
 
The assembly recommended the single-transferable vote system (British Columbia 
Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, 2003). This voting system received 57 per 
cent support in the referendum, just short of the required 60 per cent majority. 
 
Despite this narrow rejection, perceptions about the citizens’ assembly - its 
representativeness, competence and independence - were important to voters that 
knew about it (around 60 per cent of the electorate); the more they knew about the 
assembly, the more they trusted it (Warren and Pearse, 2008: 17-18). Mark Warren, 
Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, stated that: 
 
It was remarkable to construct a body doing political work in such a way 
that people trusted it.  
(interview, 23 November 2009) 
 
A citizens’ assembly on electoral reform, modelled on the British Columbia 
experiment, took place in Ontario in 2006-07.18 Again, the assembly’s 
recommendation failed to pass the referendum.  
 
A lesson that emerges from both these experiences is the importance of connecting 
the ‘mini-public’ of the assembly (or other deliberative forum) to the broader public 
sphere by using both the process and outcome of deliberation as a vehicle for debate 
                                                            
18  See http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/ 
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and education (Mark Warren interview, 23 November 2009). Many deliberative polls 
have been run in concert with media organisations (Smith, 2005: 43).  
 
Professor John Gastil of the Department of Communication at the University of 
Washington advocated a hybrid approach in which citizens’ juries of 20-24 people 
would identify areas of agreement and disagreement in order to frame the key issues 
for deliberation, followed by a larger citizens’ assembly which would produce 
recommendations (interview, 6 November 2009).  
 
Impact of deliberation  
Practitioners of deliberative methods argue that they offer advantages over the use of 
consultative methods alone. Smith (2005: 55) suggests that:  
 
• Deliberations reflect on a variety of experiences and competing viewpoints. 
 
• Selection methods mean that all citizens have an equal opportunity to 
participate and no social group is systematically excluded. 
 
• Events are run by independent organisations to ensure transparency and 
fairness. 
 
• Outcomes reflect citizens’ considered judgements as opposed to the ‘top of the 
head’ preferences expressed in opinion polls.  
 
Deliberative methods may also be especially suitable for issues where the public is 
ill-informed or misinformed or where it has failed to confront the trade-offs and 
complexities inherent in public policy.19 
 
In this sense, the outcomes of a deliberative process can be promoted as a 
legitimate proxy for the conclusions the public would reach, if people had opportunity 
to become fully informed and engaged. Properly constructed deliberative 
methodologies are thus relatively immune to the charges of being skewed or 
unrepresentative (Ian O’Flynn interview, 27 October 2009).  
  
Deliberative approaches are relatively expensive compared with consultative 
methods: participants are generally paid an honorarium and much effort is required to 
select participants and sustain their involvement. The national consultation 
committee in Australia opted against a deliberative poll, judging that it wouldn’t 
‘deliver bang for the buck politically’ (Frank Brennan interview, 20 November 2009). 
                                                            
19  See also http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary/ 
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Our review suggests that this concern is mitigated if the process is designed  
to communicate the deliberative event in order to build trust and interest in the 
broader consultation.  
 
Deliberative forums should not be seen as a method in isolation from wider 
consultative approaches. Their impact comes in part from being communicated to the 
wider public sphere. Moreover, targeted consultative methods may be required to 
ensure that the views of relatively powerless groups are given privileged status in the 
process (see section 3.6).  
  
3.8  Public education 
We have seen that education is an integral feature of deliberative methods. 
Interviewees say raising public knowledge and understanding is also an essential 
ingredient of consultation: however, these objectives are invariably imperfectly 
achieved and hard to measure.  
 
Some interviewees suggested that the lengthy process in Northern Ireland 
succeeded in raising overall ‘human rights literacy’ through initiatives such as training 
facilitators and mentoring of community projects by those with human rights 
expertise. Civil society actors – especially those who had contact with the Bill of 
Rights Forum - now use human rights language and concepts with greater 
confidence and sophistication than before (Catherine Donnelly interview, 30 
November 2009). Awareness is also perceived to have increased among Unionist 
parties previously unengaged with human rights (interview with Mike Ritchie, Director 
of the Committee on the Administration of Justice, 9 December 2009).  
 
Frank Brennan offered the impressionistic assessment that the Australian process 
raised the knowledge base of Australians about human rights:   
 
Education wasn’t a primary aim of the government but it was one of the 
primary aims of the committee. 
(interview, 20 November 2009) 
 
Also key, Frank Brennan added, was avoiding technical or legalistic terms and 
embracing human rights-compatible language that resonates among communities in 
Australia, such as ‘the fair go’ and ‘not falling through the cracks’. Edward Santow 
stated that those running the federal consultation were ‘plain talking’ and treated  
ill-informed questions or mendacious reporting as an opportunity to educate and 
dispel myths (interview, 26 October 2009). 
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However, educational opportunities were lost in Australia: the government’s 
discussion paper for the consultation process (Attorney-General’s Department 
(Australia), 2008), written before the committee was formed, was ‘not user-friendly’ 
and large press advertisements announcing community meetings could have 
contained more educational content (Frank Brennan interview, 20 November 2009). 
Some interviewees agreed that accessible and tailored materials should be circulated 
before the consultation proper. George Williams noted that:  
  
My philosophy is: get people involved very early and then build upon that 
with the law, but don’t pretend you can start it once the law is in place 
because it’s very hard at that point if perceptions are set against it. 
(interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
Civil society organisations put considerable resources into education. A notable 
example in Australia is the Human Rights Law Resource Centre in Melbourne.20  
It produced Engaging in the Debate (Lynch and Knowles, 2009), which sought to 
present arguments for and against human rights legislation ‘in the most informed, 
evidence-based, rational way possible’ (Phil Lynch interview, 16 November 2009).  
 
The media might be considered an essential conduit for information about human 
rights. In practice, most of the Australian committees used community discussions 
deliberately to bypass the media. George Williams suggested that in Victoria: 
 
We quickly found that media tended to polarise people and sensationalise 
issues – it’s not a place to get reasoned and nuanced debate. 
(interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
Some interviewees said that this strategy of staying ‘under the radar’ of the media 
had limited the potential for wider awareness-raising. Hilary Charlesworth in ACT 
noted that, with hindsight, her committee would have forged a positive media strategy 
to engage the local and national media (interview, 2 November 2009). Frank Brennan 
stated that the three-day public hearings in Canberra and the way they were 
disseminated and reported were a successful aspect of the process, indicating the 
value of set-piece events as a focal point for national media coverage. The Australian 
processes made more proactive use of local and community-based radio to 
announce community meetings, though these were more to inform people about 
events than to educate.  
 
                                                            
20  See http://www.hrlrc.org.au/ 
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Overall, most interviewees were dubious about how far a time-limited consultation 
aimed at gauging public preferences could fulfil a serious educational function in 
relation to human rights; this was a more deep-rooted challenge for the education 
system. A minimum requirement of a consultation process was the provision of 
impartial and accessible information (in appropriate formats and languages) and a 
concerted strategy to correct misperceptions.  
 
This review has not found any studies which objectively compare public knowledge 
and awareness before and after consultation processes. By contrast, this is an 
inherent feature of most deliberative methodologies. This again suggests the 
advantage of educating a sub-section of the population and using the results of their 
deliberation as a vehicle to inform and engage the media and the wider public.  
 
3.9  Translating process into content  
Some interviewees suggested that ‘traceability’ – being able to see the imprint of the 
process on the final outcome and the rationale for including one provision over 
another – is necessary for the outcome to be seen as legitimate. Yet the success of 
consultations in the volume and diversity of views and experiences they generate 
presents challenges of its own. In this section, we examine how different processes 
have synthesised the (sometimes conflicting) results of consultation or deliberation in 
their final outcomes.  
 
It is notable that, in jurisdictions where there has been any degree of public 
participation in developing a Bill of Rights, the effect of that participation has been to 
give popular weight to legislative options for change and/or to expand or strengthen 
the government’s proposed legislative model in specific ways.  
 
This has partly been a ‘numbers game’. The recommendations of committees in 
Australia and of the NIHRC in Northern Ireland were wholly or partly justified in terms 
of the volume of submissions received, the results of opinion surveys and, in ACT, 
the majority preference in the deliberative poll.  
 
However, interviewees emphasise that consultation processes should not be 
majoritarian exercises: indeed, Bills of Rights derive from the imperative to protect 
individuals and minorities from the consequences of majority rule (Kavanagh, 2004: 
964-68). To counter this danger, consultative bodies like the Australian committees 
and the NIHRC have tended to elevate the voices and priorities of less powerful 
groups in society (such as those engaged through the devolved consultations 
described in section 3.6). Consultative committee reports in Australia are suffused 
with personal stories of abuse or neglect. George Williams noted that: 
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That was the powerful message – what people had to say to us – and it 
was our job to translate that into legal outcomes. 
(interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
These narratives add authenticity and urgency to the recommendations. Yet 
synthesising thousands of diverse stories along with submissions from expert bodies 
is challenging, as Frank Brennan acknowledged:  
 
Trying to balance the contributions that reflect lived experience and those 
of a more theoretical or abstract nature was problematic … was an 
ongoing and irresolvable tension in drafting our report. 
(interview, 20 November 2009)   
 
George Williams considered that one way of mitigating this problem is to channel the 
submissions more effectively by asking carefully structured questions designed to 
make the responses easier to analyse and present in the final outcome, as happened 
in Victoria and Western Australia (interview, 27 October 2009). Edward Santow 
argued for submissions to be assessed qualitatively as well as quantitatively; he 
suggested that detailed submissions and those from organisations with large 
memberships should be given greater weight than tick-box responses from 
individuals (interview, 26 October 2009).  
 
Examples of impact 
The impact of consultation and deliberation is visible in specific provisions of 
(proposed) Bills of Rights.  
 
In Canada, NGO submissions to the parliamentary hearings secured more expansive 
definitions of some rights, stronger equality measures and a more narrowly defined 
limitation clause which placed a greater onus on the government to prove its case if it 
wanted to limit rights (Peter Russell interview, 9 November 2009).  
 
In Western Australia, as in ACT, the independent committee was convinced by the 
consultation to recommend a HRA including socio-economic rights. Its chair, Fred 
Chaney, said that:  
 
I wouldn’t have foreseen before the inquiry that we could be quite so 
settled in our minds that this could be a useful instrument and I wouldn’t 
have foreseen that we would go beyond civil and political rights.  
(interview, 23 November 2009) 
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Spencer Zifcak argued that the national consultation report in Australia highlights 
areas of disadvantage that would not have been as prominent had consultation not 
taken place (interview, 14 December 2009). These include the position of people with 
mental illness, older people, people in remote rural areas and children in need of 
protection. These issues are not necessarily traceable to specific provisions in the 
proposed HRA but add ballast to the case for having one. 
 
Also prominent in the report are the ‘hot button issues’ - abortion, euthanasia, 
religious freedom and same-sex marriage – that surfaced repeatedly in community 
meetings. Frank Brennan stated that the committee confronted these issues (in its 
recommendations on the respective roles of parliament and the courts) ‘because they 
would be thrown in the face of any government proposing a HRA’ (interview, 20 
November 2009).  
 
A key requirement here is transparency. The NIHRC’s advice on the content of a Bill 
of Rights was developed according to a methodology which was transparent and had 
itself been consulted on (see section 2.6). As one interviewee put it, the Commission 
decided ‘it was important to be able to justify rigorously the inclusion of any 
supplementary right’.  
 
The Australian federal consultation committee set out the case for and against 
legislative and other options for strengthening human rights protection and specified 
how many submissions supported or opposed each option. When an option attracted 
strong support and the committee considered that its advantages outweighed any 
disadvantages, it was generally recommended (NHRCC, 2009: 343). Frank Brennan 
noted that the committee was scrupulous in presenting the weight of opinion for each 
option and the origins of submissions, including those generated by campaigns: 
 
No one could say we were putting too glowing a picture on the pro-HRA 
case. We gave the negative case all the weight it could possibly enjoy ... 
We did everything possible to faithfully reflect the views and opinions we 
heard throughout the Consultation process, regardless of our personal 
perspectives or preference. The report reflects what we heard and  
were told. 
(interview, 20 November 2009) 
 
The federal process differed from the process in ACT and Victoria, then, in that it did 
not draft a Human Rights Act but put forward recommendations as to its content and 
enforcement mechanisms. Spencer Zifcak suggested that, in the Australian context, 
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this approach could leave the recommendations vulnerable to being undermined by 
the vocal lobby against a federal HRA, notably from evangelical Christian groups:  
 
Recommendations about content are not enough to fend off 
misinformation and scaremongering … you need to be able to show 
exactly what you are or are not proposing [in the legislation].  
(interview, 14 December 2009) 
 
In the case of either a draft Bill or a set of recommendations, interviewees concurred 
that consultative bodies should be transparent about the rationale for the outcome, 
where possible relating specific provisions to expressed community preferences. 
They should balance qualitative and quantitative methods in processing submissions, 
and should give elevated status in the outcome to the views and priorities of  
people most likely to suffer breaches of their human rights, as in the consultation 
process itself.  
 
Further, ‘traceability’ requires that governments respond to and act upon the 
outcomes of consultation. If these are seen to be disregarded, there is a risk that the 
process and any resulting legislation will not be seen as legitimate. This underlines 
again the importance of a clear statement of intent that commits the government to 
act on the outcomes of a consultative process and states clearly the parameters 
within which it is prepared to act (see section 3.3).   
 
3.10 Timescale  
The processes under review involved hugely varying timescales: from three months 
in Tasmania to a decade in Northern Ireland. It is perilous to suggest an optimum 
timeframe as this factor is context-specific. Yet interviewees in different jurisdictions 
overlapped in their view of how timeframes should be designed once political 
conditions are considered propitious to invite public engagement.  
 
Most recommended a defined period of outward-facing consultation:  
 
It’s better to build excitement and interest … in a concentrated and 
sustained way or you run the risk of losing momentum and people losing 
interest.  
(George Williams interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
Suggestions for this ranged from six months to one year, depending partly on 
whether there was any pre-existing momentum from civil society. A consultation 
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shorter than six months would be unlikely adequately to engage hard-to-reach 
groups.   
  
Some interviewees argued that, from the point at which the government agrees to 
hold a consultation, several months of preparation are required to: appoint an 
independent body if that is the model chosen; assemble a secretariat; prepare 
educational materials, and harness the expertise and engagement of civil society. 
Delegating consultation to specialist and community groups permits broader 
coverage over a shorter period of time. The pre-consultation phase may also include 
negotiations with political parties and/or devolved authorities to secure their 
engagement with the process. 
  
Some interviewees argued that the federal process in Australia had been too short; 
the intensity of the process might have hindered its capacity to break down 
bureaucratic obstruction and necessitated a ‘rough and ready’ approach to 
processing submissions. Interviewees in New Zealand cautioned against truncating 
the synthesising and drafting period too drastically: 
 
You need to do justice to a range of evidence … A human rights approach 
demands that this be done with consideration and reflection because you 
are dealing with vulnerable groups whose voice needs to be listened to 
particularly carefully. It isn’t just a matter of adding up the number of 
mentions of an issue. 
(Joanna Collinge interview, 17 November 2009) 
  
In practice, drafting periods have varied. The federal committee in Australia  
took only three months to process more than 30,000 submissions and draft its 
recommendations. The NIHRC delivered its advice around eight months after the  
Bill of Rights Forum made its recommendations (meeting the deadline it had publicly 
set itself).  
 
Overall, most interviewees favoured arrangements which provide for a clear 
beginning, middle and end to a process; it must not be unduly protracted as it was  
in Northern Ireland because this can breed disillusionment and dissipate momentum. 
In settled democracies, this concentrated period of consultation and deliberation has 
invariably been preceded by a period of civil society activism which has generated 
impetus behind the process, as in Australia. Where this demand is lacking, and the 
impetus is largely top-down (as in New Zealand), the chances of achieving 
meaningful engagement within a limited timeframe are likely to be reduced.  
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3.11 Resources 
As with timescale, the issue of what constitutes adequate resources for a 
consultation process is specific both to the political context and factors such as the 
size of the jurisdiction.  
 
The Australian federal consultation had a budget of 2.8 million Australian dollars 
(around £1.54 million) and a secretariat of around 20 people based in the Attorney-
General’s Department (Frank Brennan interview, 20 November 2009). The federal 
consultation was proportionately better resourced than those at state and territory 
level. Chair Frank Brennan worked full time on the consultation, allowing for a more 
intensive and fast-moving process. Some interviewees recommended ‘front-loading’ 
resources in order that consultative or deliberative activities can ‘hit the ground 
running’, combined with more sophisticated use of new technology than previous 
processes have achieved. They added that if an independent committee is 
established, it must include at least one member with human rights expertise and be 
supported by a secretariat with legal, policy and public relations competence.   
 
Deliberative methods are relatively expensive: the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly cost 5.5 million Canadian dollars (around £3.2 million).21 The cost of 
deliberative polls varies greatly but they are inherently resource-intensive. 
Experiments in online deliberative polling suggest that this may become a cost-
effective alternative to conventional polling (Fishkin et al., 2003).  
  
Resource issues surfaced in Northern Ireland where, in 2002, two commissioners 
resigned because, among other concerns, the Bill of Rights process ‘had not 
received the internal allocation of resources (in time, thought or money) it requires’ 
(Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2003; Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission, 2004a: 8).  
 
Yet where public involvement has been minimal, as in New Zealand and Canada, 
interviewees did not attribute this to a shortage of resources as such. Rather,  
they suggested, it is the political intent behind a Bill of Rights process that  
determines its scale and ambition. A key lesson to emerge from these precedents  
is that the process of creating a Bill of Rights is, as one seminar participant noted, 
‘better not done at all than done badly’: the risk of a process that lacks serious 
political commitment and momentum is disillusionment and a lack of legitimacy  
for the outcome.  
 
 
                                                            
21  See http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/ 
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3.12 Responsibilities 
Debates about the merits, or dangers, of connecting rights and responsibilities  
are well-rehearsed (Lazarus et al., 2009). In the UK, the responsibilities of citizens  
to the state and to each other feature prominently in the political discourse of the  
two main parties at Westminster (see Chapter 4). By contrast, no Bill of Rights 
process outside the UK has included questions about individual responsibility in its 
terms of reference.  
 
In Victoria, the insertion of ‘responsibilities’ in the title and preamble of the Charter 
(though not its substantive content) was a response to community-level discussions. 
George Williams argued that including responsibilities had ‘tactical value’ in  
heading off opposition from those who perceive human rights as individualistic; 
responsibilities were a ‘key part of the rhetoric’ and should be ‘reclaimed strongly as 
part of the human rights debate’ (interview, 27 October 2009). Responsibilities were 
not a prominent feature of the national debate in Australia (Spencer Zifcak interview, 
14 December 2009). The national consultation report proposes a list of civic 
responsibilities ‘as a matter of education and culture’ but these are not recommended 
for inclusion in legislation (Frank Brennan interview, 20 November 2009).  
 
The national committee was ‘troubled’ to learn that more than 40 per cent of 
Australians surveyed agreed that if some members of a group abused the wider 
community’s rights then it was reasonable to restrict the rights of the entire group;  
57 per cent agreed that it was reasonable to reduce or take away an individual’s 
rights if s/he did not respect the community’s rights (NHRCC, 2009: 347). In ACT, 
critics of the HRA proposed a Charter of Responsibilities Bill which prescribed, 
among other things, that a person ‘must not harass, annoy or interfere with anyone 
else in their community, for example by not upholding the proper values of the 
community’.22 The ACT parliament rejected it.  
 
These examples illustrate how social anxieties and prejudices can surface during 
processes which invite debate about citizenship, rights, values and public policy 
priorities. Interviewees suggested that giving prominence to responsibilities in a Bill of 
Rights process can be volatile in the context of low public understanding about (or 
antipathy towards) human rights; it can generate ill-informed notions of rights being 
contingent on the exercise of responsibilities, particularly in relation to unpopular or 
marginalised groups. For this reason, without exception, interviewees said 
responsibilities should be incorporated in the consultation process in the context of 
education about human rights and the duty to respect the rights of others, rather than 
as the basis for substantive legislative provisions.  
                                                            
22  See http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/b/db_12795/20040623-14574/pdf/db_12795.pdf 
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3.13 Referendum 
It is beyond our scope to do justice to the arguments for and against legislative 
referenda or other types of popular vote such as the multi-choice ballot or 
‘preferendum’ (JUSTICE, 2007: 97-98; Smith, 2005: 80-81). No Bill of Rights process 
we have reviewed has used a referendum either to initiate the legislative stage of a 
Bill of Rights or after its enactment as a means of democratic entrenchment.  
 
The federal consultation in Australia excluded the option of constitutional 
entrenchment partly to avoid the need for a referendum; constitutional reform which 
would have extended certain rights to states was overwhelmingly rejected in a 
referendum in 1988 (Byrnes et al., 2009: 32-33). The issue has reverberated in 
debate about a federal HRA. Opponents argue that a referendum is a prerequisite for 
an Act to be considered legitimate, while pro-HRA voices say the consultation 
process was a quicker and more cost-effective alternative to gauge popular 
preferences (The Age, 2009).  
 
If a referendum is held, one lesson noted by the New Zealand Constitutional 
Arrangements Committee in 2005 is for it to take place as soon as possible after the 
consultation process, while public consensus still holds (JUSTICE, 2007: 98). 
 
JUSTICE (2007: 97) argues that a referendum ‘would be of great benefit in ensuring 
popular support for rights protection’. Some interviewees agreed that a constitutional 
Bill of Rights requires a legitimating referendum like that which preceded Scottish 
devolution. If announced early in the process, this might also generate momentum 
behind the process (Graham Smith interview, 9 November 2009).  
 
Even supporters of a referendum, however, say the legitimacy of the result depends 
in turn on the quality of deliberation that precedes it (Ian O’Flynn interview, 27 
October 2009). Whether a consultative process is an adjunct to, or replacement for,  
a referendum, there is a considerable onus on the process to be rigorous and 
transparent in its popular engagement.  
 
3.14 Conclusion 
The experience analysed here raises two questions crucial to our inquiry. How far 
can we reach definitive conclusions about what methods and approaches will confer 
popular legitimacy on a Bill of Rights? And how far can experience in one jurisdiction 
inform practice in another? 
 
Leane (2004: 156) argues that it is a moot point whether widespread participation is a 
prerequisite for achieving legitimacy, or whether elite support and an absence of 
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widespread resistance will suffice: after all, the Canadian Charter involved minimal 
public engagement yet has achieved iconic status. Leane’s observation illustrates the 
specificity of each national experience (for example, no comparable jurisdiction had 
Trudeau’s charismatic leadership). However, our review suggests that Canada’s 
experience does not necessarily provide insights that can be generalised to other (or 
future) Bills of Rights processes. In the almost three decades since Canada’s Charter 
was enacted, expectations have increased that any process to create a new human 
rights instrument - especially one that is constitutionally entrenched - will be 
genuinely participatory. This expectation is backed by developing law, theory and 
practice on the right to participation. It is fuelled further by the development of 
consultative and deliberative approaches and new technology which permits ever 
broader, more inclusive and more sophisticated forms of public engagement.  
 
No single method of consultation or deliberation is a ‘magic bullet’ for achieving 
popular ownership and methods may legitimately vary. Colm O’Cinneide, Reader in 
Laws at University College London, noted that even processes designed to be 
genuinely participatory:  
 
... rarely satisfy those who are opposed to … a measure or highly sceptical 
about state action in the area in general. 
(interview, 18 December 2009) 
 
Yet the inevitability of political opposition is itself an imperative to design the process 
so that it can be defended from the accusation that it is anti-democratic, partisan or 
the project of a self-selecting clique. The form of consultation and the institutions 
used have a profound effect on what it is possible to achieve in terms of popular 
ownership and understanding. Here, we extract some general insights which, in the 
view of those who have designed or studied such processes, constitute best practice 
and may be transferable between national contexts.  
 
• In all Bills of Rights processes, one ‘non-negotiable’ has been a commitment to 
go forwards, not backwards in terms of human rights standards and 
enforcement, invariably by incorporating and building on international human 
rights treaties. We may conclude that any process which does the opposite will 
be viewed as setting a dangerous precedent internationally. This is likely to 
affect the legitimacy of the outcome both at home and abroad.  
 
• It is desirable to have a clear statement of intent from the government of the day 
about the purpose of a Bill of Rights and the terms of reference of the process 
for creating it. This entails a clear procedural commitment to act on the results 
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of public consultation and deliberation within certain parameters which must be 
transparently stated and justified.  
 
• The ensuing process must be matched to that purpose. Its credibility is likely to 
be enhanced if it is seen to be independent of government and to have no 
vested interest in the outcome and if its methods are open to scrutiny and 
combine both qualitative and quantitative approaches.  
 
• The body running the process should be capable of facilitating community-level 
discussions as well as expert opinion. Community discussion should be as 
unconstrained as possible whilst being informed to the greatest extent it can be 
about existing human rights protections and options for building on them, and 
the boundaries of what is considered politically feasible.  
 
• Further, the process should ideally contain forums for deliberation as well as 
broader consultation, and should be skilfully designed to connect the two.  
 
• The process should also place the highest premium on eliciting the views and 
experiences of groups whose human rights are most vulnerable to being 
breached, and should give those voices an elevated status in the processing of 
responses.  
 
• It is desirable for processes to have a clear timeframe with, at some point, a 
momentum-building phase that generates interest even among those previously 
unengaged.  
 
• Processes should be adequately resourced so as to be appropriately ambitious 
for the stated purpose. Human rights expertise should be ‘hard-wired’ into the 
process both in the body running the consultation and, where appropriate, in the 
form of a separate advisory committee.  
 
• The outcome of consultation should be transparent about the rationale for 
specific provisions and how these relate to community preferences and 
experiences.  
 
• No Bill of Rights process has included notions of individual responsibility in its 
terms of reference for developing legislation; any decision to do so must be 
cognisant of the risk that debates about rights, citizenship, values and public 
policy priorities may act as a lightning rod for social anxieties and prejudices. 
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Interviewees strongly suggested that responsibilities are properly a matter of 
education about the duty to protect the rights of others.  
 
It is premature to assess objectively how far the participatory processes in Australia 
and Northern Ireland might secure democratic legitimacy for final outcomes. Where 
Bills of Rights have been enacted, the real test of popular ownership may come from 
emerging case law and success in using legislation as a vehicle for human rights 
education and a driver of public policy. 
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4. The UK context: Westminster 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines (i) the position of the main UK political parties at Westminster 
on the process of creating a new Bill of Rights, including consultation to date on the 
Labour government’s proposed Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, and (ii) public 
attitudes to and understanding of human rights legislation.  
 
4.2 The UK government’s position  
In July 2007, in its Green Paper The Governance of Britain, the Labour 
government announced that it would consult the public on creating a Bill of Rights 
and Duties as a ‘framework for giving practical effect to our common values’ and to 
‘make explicit the way in which a democratic society’s rights have to be balanced 
by obligations’ (HM Government, 2007: 61). Consultation on the proposed Bill was 
viewed as part of a broader process of constitutional renewal. The Green Paper 
presented options for reinvigorating democracy and for making the executive and 
parliament more accountable. It also invited debate about citizenship and a ‘British 
statement of values’ (HM Government, 2007: 11).  
 
This was followed in 2009 by a Green Paper aimed at launching a national debate 
on how the relationship between the citizen and the state ‘might best be defined in 
the context of rights, responsibilities and values which unite us across all parts of 
the UK’ and proposing the creation of a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities (Ministry 
of Justice, 2009a: 7). The 2009 Green Paper presents a continuum of possibilities 
for the legal effect of such a Bill. At one end is a declaratory and symbolic 
statement; at the other is a set of rights and responsibilities directly enforceable by 
the individual in the courts. Along the continuum are options including a statement 
of interpretative principles which might inform legislation as well as public authority 
and court decisions (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 51). The Green Paper (Ministry of 
Justice, 2009a: 57) indicates that the UK government’s position is that it:  
 
... does not consider that a generally applicable model of directly legally 
enforceable rights or responsibilities would be the most appropriate.  
 
The Green Paper states that, under a new Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, 
parliament would remain free to legislate on policy areas such as eligibility for 
access to benefits or services and the treatment of criminal (including terrorist) 
suspects: ‘the courts would have no power to strike down or re-write future 
legislation in these areas’ (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 57).  
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The Green Paper notes that in relation to economic, social and cultural rights,  
the government ‘would not seek to create new and individually enforceable  
legal rights’; however, existing welfare rights might be expressed in the form of 
constitutional principles or a set of social and economic guarantees (Ministry of 
Justice, 2009a: 43). The parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) 
has recommended that any UK Bill of Rights should include the rights to health, 
education, housing and an adequate standard of living. It suggests the imposition 
of a duty on the government to achieve the progressive realisation of the relevant 
rights, by legislative or other means, and to report to parliament on its progress. 
Addressing the government’s objection that legally enforceable economic and 
social rights would usurp democratic functions, the JCHR proposes that these 
rights would not be enforceable by individuals; rather, the courts would have a 
tightly circumscribed role in reviewing government actions to ensure that 
commitments were not being ignored (JCHR, 2008a: 53-56).  
 
In relation to responsibilities, the Green Paper notes that ‘fundamental rights 
cannot be made legally contingent on the exercise of responsibilities’ (Ministry of 
Justice, 2009a: 18). However, some responsibilities ‘might deserve to be given an 
elevated constitutional status, over and above their operation as part of the general 
law or our individual moral codes’ (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 28). 
 
The Labour government has said it will not repeal or resile from the Human Rights 
Act (HRA): it remains committed to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the HRA 
and the mechanisms used to implement those rights (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 
58). Any new Bill of Rights and Responsibilities might either subsume the HRA or 
preserve it as a separate Act. The Green Paper adds that it might also be 
desirable to ‘signpost’ the Convention rights, for example by cross-referencing to 
make clear that neither they nor the HRA were affected by the new Bill (Ministry of 
Justice, 2009a: 58). 
 
4.3 Consultation process on the Green Paper23 
This section focuses on the consultation on the 2009 Green Paper on a Bill of Rights 
and Responsibilities.  
 
                                                            
23  Unless sourced otherwise, this section is based on an interview with Edward Adams, 
Head of the Human Rights Division at the Ministry of Justice, and Glenn Preston, Head of 
Projects and Communications at the Ministry of Justice on 18 November 2009; the 
People, Power and Politics consultation page at http://governance.justice.gov.uk/; and 
documentation relating to the recruitment and research methodology of the deliberative 
events supplied by the Ministry of Justice. The author is grateful to the Ministry of Justice 
for supplying this documentation and for the opportunity to observe the deliberative event 
in Birmingham on 28 November 2009.  
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We note that consultation on the 2007 Governance of Britain Green Paper also 
included some activity relating to a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. The proposed 
Bill was one of the topics for discussion at a series of town hall-style events held in 
England in 2008; other topics were a statement of values, community engagement 
and the electoral system.24 The plan announced in 200725 and reiterated in 2008 
(Ministry of Justice, 2008a: 22) for a ‘Citizens’ Summit’ to formulate a ‘British 
statement of values’ which might form the preamble to a Bill of Rights did not  
take place.  
 
The consultation on the 2009 Green Paper has been styled ‘People, Power and 
Politics’ and has consisted of: 
 
A series of deliberative events  
The aim of these was ‘to involve all parts of the country and society’ in a discussion 
about: 
 
• the values that people in the UK subscribe to; 
 
• how power is distributed in our society; 
 
• how our rights and freedoms are protected; and 
 
• how we ensure that our responsibilities to one another are fulfilled. 
 
Initially, five regional events were held around Britain (but not in Northern Ireland) 
and focused primarily on issues of ‘identity, belonging and values’ as factors that 
might underpin people’s understanding of constitutional change and a Bill of Rights. 
Each event had around 100 people, randomly sampled to reflect the UK population. 
Participants viewed filmed contributions by expert commentators with competing 
perspectives, heard presentations by a minister or senior representative of the 
                                                            
24  See for example http://governance.justice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/brighton-
note-of-table-discussions.pdf; http://governance.justice.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/08/newcastle-note-of-table-discussions.pdf; 
http://governance.justice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/bristol-30-june-table-
discussions.pdf; http://governance.justice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/london-
note-of-table-discussions.pdf. Another event in Leicester invited members of the public 
and representatives of the local community to debate broader issues of democratic and 
constitutional renewal with ministers and MPs; see 
http://governance.justice.gov.uk/2008/01/30/leicester-event-response-from-michael-wills-
mp/ and http://governance.justice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/leciester-event-key-
themes-from-the-feedback-session1.pdf 
 
25  See http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page13008 
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Ministry of Justice and were given written stimulus material and exercises to provoke 
discussion. They were polled on key questions at the beginning and end of the event 
to give a snapshot of how views had changed, with several hours of mainly group-
based, facilitated discussion in between. The polling was not representative of wider 
views; the events were primarily qualitative, with substance drawn from recordings of 
the group deliberations. Following the event, participants were encouraged to record 
personal thoughts and experiences relating to rights and responsibilities in a 
‘scrapbook’ and submit it as part of the consultation. 
 
The principles underpinning the process were drawn from the UK government’s Code 
of Practice on Consultation (Better Regulation Executive, 2008) and guidance on 
effective public engagement (Central Office of Information, 2009), and the National 
Framework for Greater Citizen Engagement (Ministry of Justice, 2008b), which sets 
out a proposed constitutional framework for the use of a number of engagement 
mechanisms, including deliberative methods. The methodology used in the 
deliberative events has been used in consultations on other policy areas, but this is 
the first time it has been used in relation to constitutional change. 
  
Two further national deliberative events were held, following a similar format and 
consisting of around 120 participants who had each attended one of the previous 
events. Those attending were again sampled to be broadly reflective of the UK 
population. At these, deliberations focused on:  
 
• views about existing rights and responsibilities; 
 
• views about a Bill of Rights, including whether it should include socio-economic 
rights and/or responsibilities, and if so how they should be enforced on a 
spectrum from ‘declaratory’ to ‘fully justiciable’; 
 
• views about a written constitution, including which institution people trust most 
to protect their rights; and 
 
• reactions to the findings at the regional deliberative events about a statement  
of values.  
  
Edward Adams, Head of the Human Rights Division of the Ministry of Justice, 
commented that only two options were ruled out as subjects for deliberation: 
repealing or resiling from the HRA and making rights legally contingent on 
responsibilities. This decision arose directly from the exclusion of these options from 
the Green Paper. Participants were made aware of the government’s reluctance, as 
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stated in the Green Paper, to create new and individually enforceable socio-
economic rights, but were encouraged to debate the merits of including these and 
other rights and to consider what the trade-offs might be:  
 
We’re not putting boundaries around it … If people come out with the view 
that what they want are hard-edged, legally justiciable rights to healthcare 
… that will be a conclusion we’ll report to ministers.  
(Edward Adams interview, 18 November 2009) 
 
At time of writing, a final national event was planned for 20 February 2010, involving 
people drawn from the two earlier national events and focusing on a written 
constitution. The results of the earlier events are not yet available for review.  
Human Rights Minister Michael Wills told the JCHR that:  
 
The headline is that there is a real popular appetite, judged by these 
events at least, to discuss these issues and a very significant majority in 
favour of having a new Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.  
(oral evidence, 2 December 2009)26  
 
Online consultation  
An online forum invites debate on the content and enforcement mechanisms of a Bill 
of Rights and Responsibilities and on ‘values in the UK today’.27 It has received very 
few responses. Glenn Preston, Head of Projects and Communications at the Ministry 
of Justice, said the Ministry hoped to use the outcome of the deliberative events to 
stimulate engagement online (interview, 18 November 2009). At time of writing in 
February 2010, there is no record of the events online.  
 
In-house consultation  
Alongside formal submissions to the Green Paper, the Ministry of Justice is 
conducting bilateral consultations, transcripts of which will be put on the website.  
As of November 2009, among the groups consulted were:  
 
• faith groups; 
 
• children and young people: this involved the preparation of a Young People’s 
Guide, produced jointly with the Office of Children’s Rights Director; this office 
                                                            
26  See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/uc112-
i/uc11202.htm 
 
27  See http://governance.justice.gov.uk/join-the-debate/ 
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also organised a national event on rights and responsibilities and polling of 
around 1,800 young people who are ‘away from home’ (including in care or at a 
boarding school) – activities which will inform the office’s formal response to the 
consultation;  
 
• UNICEF and the Children’s Rights Alliance for England: this included a half day 
workshop with young people; and 
 
• the Community Sector Coalition: this involved exploring how civil society might 
participate in the debate. 
 
Essay-writing competition 
The competition, for young people aged between 11 and 18, invites essays on rights, 
responsibilities and options for enforcement.28 
 
Future plans  
Glenn Preston indicated that the Ministry of Justice is likely to commission a 
quantitative poll of at least 2,000 people before the conclusion of the consultation  
in the first quarter of 2010; the content will be informed by the outcome of the 
deliberative events and the findings are intended to be published along with the 
outcome of the deliberative events. He added that: 
 
We are at the earliest stages of gauging how people feel … I think this 
process is exciting exactly because we were able to talk to members of 
the public who have never talked about these issues before … The 
government is clear that this is a debate that has to take a considerable 
period of time. 
(interview, 18 November 2009) 
 
The Office for Public Management is conducting an independent evaluation of the 
deliberative events; this is not publicly available at time of writing. Formal responses 
to the Green Paper will be considered after the closing date of 26 February 2010.  
 
Assessment of the consultation process  
Aside from the content of the Green Paper, interviewees were mostly unfamiliar with 
the consultation process. Graham Smith observed that the process so far had been:  
 
                                                            
28  http://governance.justice.gov.uk/2009/12/10/rights-and-responsibilities-essay-writing-
competition/ 
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... underwhelming – in essence it hasn’t begun yet because it has 
registered so low in public interest that most people haven’t noticed. 
(interview, 9 November 2009) 
 
Andrew Dismore MP, who chairs the JCHR, described the whole endeavour as a 
‘missed opportunity … done on the cheap’ and too long delayed (interview, 7 January 
2010). Another interviewee noted that the Green Paper was a ‘reasonable starting 
point’ but had little momentum or support behind it from the public, interest groups or 
Labour Party activists. 
 
Some seminar participants were uneasy about the prominence in the consultation 
process of the idea of a statement of values that might form part of a preamble to a 
Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. One noted that the process of articulating a set of 
common beliefs or characteristics might have the effect of making minorities ‘feel 
they don’t belong’, adding that: 
 
Trying to impose such an identity on devolved nations – or on the multi-
national and multi-cultural communities in the various parts of the UK - 
poses great risks. 
 
Without exception, interviewees in the UK were concerned about the way notions of 
responsibility have been constructed in the consultation process. One said that the 
connection between rights and responsibilities was, as constructed, ‘worrying and 
muddled’. Another commented: 
 
[Responsibility] can be addressed as part of civic education, but has no 
jurisprudential meaning. It’s just a buzzword that politicians like … it’s 
perilous and it confuses people. 
 
Qudsi Rasheed of JUSTICE noted that codes of responsibilities are part of the 
communitarian and authoritarian rather than the liberal tradition (see also Lazarus et 
al., 2009):   
 
At best, responsibilities would be superfluous and at worst they’d be dangerous 
– we can’t see any benefit in having them in the discussion ... Our approach 
would be to reject them and give very clear reasons why they are rejected: 
they’re already inherent in rights and normal laws that impose duties or 
responsibilities can be passed as part of the normal democratic process. 
(interview, 23 November 2009) 
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At the time of the writing in February 2010, the consultation has not concluded. It is 
therefore premature to offer any definitive assessment of the process. However, 
almost a year on from the publication of the Green Paper, we offer some preliminary 
observations informed by our analysis of Bills of Rights processes elsewhere.  
 
One lesson from other jurisdictions is the imperative, over the lifetime of a 
consultation process, to publicise deliberative events and to use them as a vehicle to 
educate and engage the wider public (see section 3.7). To date, this has not been 
attempted in the consultation on a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities; the deliberative 
events are not publicised on the consultation website and have taken place largely 
unnoticed by the media or the wider public. It remains to be seen how far the 
deliberative events, once concluded, might be used to frame public debate or to 
ignite broader interest in the process. 
 
The Ministry has produced an Easy Read guide to the Green Paper (Ministry of 
Justice, 2009c). As noted above, the consultation has also included activity to 
engage children and young people and faith groups. At time of writing, it is unclear 
how far the consultation has engaged directly with other groups or individuals who 
might face discrimination or disadvantage or who might need particular support to 
participate in the process. As noted in section 3.6, interviewees from other 
jurisdictions considered direct engagement with people who are disadvantaged 
and/or disaffected to be an essential component of the process of creating a Bill of 
Rights if it is to reflect the views and experiences of those whose human rights are 
most vulnerable to being breached. 
 
As noted in section 3.4, the principle of independence has been established by 
consultative processes in Australia. Most interviewees in the UK stated a preference 
for the consultation to be run by a body independent of government. One noted that 
the fact that the present consultation was being run by the government had made it 
harder to win public trust in the process and had made a Bill of Rights appear to be 
‘just another piece of legislation’. Another noted that an independent body would be 
of particular value in a context in which political debate about a Bill of Rights has 
become unduly politicised.  
 
4.4  The Conservative Party’s position  
The Conservative Party’s position has shifted over the past decade and appears still 
not to be firmly fixed.  
 
In 2001, the party pledged to repeal the HRA; by 2005, the commitment was to 
‘reform or repeal’ it (Erdos, 2009: 38). In 2006, David Cameron announced his 
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intention to scrap the HRA (but not the UK’s ratification of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, or ECHR) and introduce ‘a modern British Bill of Rights to define 
the core values which give us our identity as a free nation’ and to ‘balance rights and 
responsibilities’ (Cameron, 2006). The Conservative Party has not indicated whether, 
or how, a future Bill of Rights might incorporate the ECHR using a different 
mechanism. Unless it did so, the repeal of the HRA would mean that individuals in 
the UK would be in the same position as they were before the Act came into force, 
when they could only enforce their specific Convention rights by going to Strasbourg. 
It is not clear how a future Conservative government would then resolve the apparent 
paradox that, although the UK state would be legally bound to comply with the ECHR 
(and with Strasbourg decisions against the UK) there would be no mechanism, as 
such, to require domestic courts to apply the Convention.  
 
David Cameron (2006) stated that the creation of a Bill of Rights would involve a 
process to ‘promote public debate as the drafting proceeds, in order to achieve a 
lasting consensus’. The nature of this process has not been elaborated, though 
Shadow Justice Secretary Dominic Grieve (2009a: 7) has stated that he expects it to 
take the form of a Green Paper. For now, the party has established a commission of 
jurists and other legal experts to provide advice. It has been meeting since 2007 but 
at the time of writing in February 2010 it has not yet published any proposals. 
 
Pending this advice, Dominic Grieve (2009a: 9) has indicated that a Conservative-
designed Bill of Rights, while it would be compatible with the ECHR, would effectively 
be decoupled from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights at 
Strasbourg by emphasising ‘the leeway of domestic courts to have regard to national 
jurisprudence and traditions and to other common law precedents’. He has stated 
(Grieve, 2009b) that: 
 
There is no reason why our courts should be bound by Strasbourg Court 
jurisprudence, if their own interpretation is different, particularly where 
rights should be balanced by responsibilities. 
 
It should be noted that section 2 of the HRA requires only that domestic courts ‘take 
account of’ Strasbourg decisions: in practice, domestic courts do apply their own 
interpretation and have sometimes made decisions that expressly divert from 
Strasbourg judgements in comparable cases.29 This discrepancy highlights the 
danger that political discourse about the HRA can, wittingly or unwittingly, 
                                                            
29  A recent example is R v Horncastle and others (Appellants) [2009] UKSC 14, in which the 
Supreme Court expressly diverts from Strasbourg case law relating to the right to a fair 
trial. 
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misrepresent the way the Act works and the impact it has had. This underlines the 
imperative for any future Bill of Rights process to start with the provision of accurate 
and impartial information about existing mechanisms to protect human rights. 
 
Dominic Grieve (2009b) has indicated that a Conservative government would, as he 
put it, ‘look at restoring a better balance between Parliament and the courts’ by 
weakening the mechanisms that the HRA contains (in section 10 and schedule 2) to 
allow courts to quash or disapply subordinate legislation (such as Regulations or 
Orders and Acts of the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly) that is 
judged to be incompatible with a Convention right. It should be noted that the HRA 
does not permit courts to strike down primary legislation, precisely in order to 
preserve parliamentary sovereignty. It is possible for higher courts to make 
declarations that primary legislation is incompatible with Convention rights; it is then 
at the discretion of the government and parliament to legislate to amend or repeal 
that legislation.30 Some seminar participants expressed concern that one effect of 
reforms aimed at ‘rebalancing’ power away from the courts might, in practice, be to 
increase the power of the executive rather than that of parliament.  
 
There are two other consistent themes in Conservative discourse around a Bill of 
Rights. The first is individual responsibilities. Grieve was quoted in the Northern 
Ireland News Letter as saying that his party intended to create a Bill of Rights that 
would have in-built safeguards to prevent those ‘whose own behaviour is lacking’ 
from abusing its powers (News Letter, 2009). He has stated (Grieve, 2009: 8) that, 
while aspirational responsibilities (such as being a good neighbour) ‘cannot be 
enforced through statute’, his party sees scope for: 
 
... interpretation clauses to provide for the better balancing of rights where 
the assertion of a right undermines the rights of others. 
  
The second theme is the purported impact of the HRA on the government’s ability to 
tackle terrorism and crime. In several well-documented instances, stories cited by 
Conservative politicians have been refuted by, among others, the government, the 
JCHR and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Department for Constitutional Affairs 
(DCA), 2006; JCHR, 2006: 5; Starmer, 2009). One example was the erroneous claim 
                                                            
30  The procedure under section 10 and schedule 2 of the Human Rights Act permits a 
Minister by remedial order to bring legislation into line with the ECHR following a 
declaration of incompatibility or a finding of the European Court of Human Rights. This 
procedure contains certain restrictions: it can only be used where there are ‘compelling 
reasons’, a draft of the order is laid before parliament with the reasons for proceeding 
under that procedure, and the draft order is approved by both Houses of Parliament. 
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that the HRA bars publication of photographs of wanted criminals, which was refuted 
by the Derbyshire Constabulary.31 Yet as recently as January 2010, David Cameron 
stated that:32  
 
We’ve said we’ll scrap the Human Rights Act, which has put our police in 
the ridiculous position of trying to tackle the most serious crimes without 
putting the faces of the most wanted criminals on posters … Instead, what 
we need is a modern British Bill of Rights which clearly sets out people’s 
rights and responsibilities, and strengthens our hand in the fight against 
terrorism and crime.  
 
Some interviewees and seminar participants noted that the knowing dissemination of 
misleading stories about the HRA creates a perilous context in which to initiate 
debate about a new Bill of Rights. They suggested further that the political priority the 
Conservatives have placed on the repeal of the HRA raises the possibility that the 
Act might be repealed without immediately being replaced by a new Bill of Rights  
if, as David Cameron acknowledges, a Bill would require a period of debate to  
build consensus.  
 
If a future Conservative government were to seek to create a British Bill of Rights as 
part of a project to weaken existing human rights protection, this would be a process 
without international precedent. As explained in section 3.2, no Bill of Rights process 
has involved the possibility of repealing or weakening existing human rights 
protections or reversing the incorporation of international human rights law into 
domestic law.  
 
4.5 The Liberal Democrats’ position  
The Liberal Democrats are committed to a written constitution for Britain that defines 
and limits the power of government. At the centre of the policy is a Bill of Rights 
which would ‘strengthen and entrench the rights guaranteed in the Human Rights 
Act’ (Liberal Democrats, 2009). The party has also published a Freedom Bill which 
seeks to reinstate civil liberties that the Liberal Democrats say successive Labour 
and Conservative governments have eroded.33 In terms of the process, the party has 
proposed a constitutional convention, with at least half the members being randomly 
                                                            
31  See http://www.thisisderbyshire.co.uk/news/Tories-slammed-attack-Derbyshire-
police/article-1402488-detail/article.html 
 
32  See http://www.thisisgloucestershire.co.uk/gloucestershireheadlines/David-Cameron-
answers-questions/article-1728873-detail/article.html 
 
33  See http://freedom.libdems.org.uk/ 
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selected from the electorate, to draw up a written constitution to be endorsed in a 
national referendum.34 The Liberal Democrats have expressed strong reservations 
about the way the debate about a Bill of Rights is being framed. Nick Clegg (2008) 
called for: 
 
... a clear and responsible stand on the Human Rights Act … Either 
Government should stand by the Human Rights Act and make it work or they 
should work across all political parties … to produce a Bill of Rights that adds 
value to existing protections. 
  
4.6  Public attitudes and understanding  
Informed consultation on a Bill of Rights requires an understanding of existing 
legislation to protect and promote human rights; it is pertinent, then, to examine 
public attitudes to, and understanding of, both the HRA and the idea of a Bill of 
Rights.  
 
Human Rights Act 
Polling covering Britain suggests that more than 80 per cent of people think it is 
important to have a law that protects human rights (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2009: 22; 
Ministry of Justice, 2008c: 27). Opinion surveys and qualitative research suggest that 
a majority of people respond positively to human rights values such as dignity, 
respect and fairness (Donald et al., 2009: 161-62; Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2009: 9; 
Ministry of Justice, 2008c: 42). However, there is a lack of detailed public 
understanding of human rights and the legislation that surrounds them (Kaur-
Ballagan et al., 2009: 8). Moreover, polling indicates that more than half the people in 
Britain consider that certain social groups take unfair advantage of the HRA, among 
them asylum seekers and refugees, immigrants, lawyers and criminals (Donald et al., 
2009: 174; Ministry of Justice, 2008c: 44).  
 
The UK government (DCA, 2006: 5) has lamented the ‘accumulative and corrosive’ 
impact of negative or misconceived media reporting upon public confidence both in 
the HRA and in the ECHR. The JCHR (2006: 16) has further blamed ministers for 
failing systematically to dispel myths about the HRA and for sometimes using the Act 
as a scapegoat for unrelated administrative failings. These observations suggest that 
any process to create a new Bill of Rights must start with the provision of balanced 
information about the HRA and the way it is implemented; as one seminar participant 
noted: ‘we cannot have a debate in a context where human rights are fundamentally 
misunderstood’.   
 
                                                            
34  See www.libdems.org.uk 
69 
 
DEVELOPING A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UK 
Bill of Rights 
Opinion surveys on a Bill of Rights are inconsistent. ICM polls over 15 years 
suggested high support for a Bill of Rights. In 1991, 79 per cent thought their rights 
would be better protected if written in a single document (Klug, 2007: 12). In 2006, an 
ICM State of the Nation survey (based on more than 2,000 face-to-face interviews 
conducted in 2006) reported that 77 per cent of those polled agreed that Britain 
needs a Bill of Rights to protect the liberty of the individual; 51 per cent agreed 
strongly (Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, 2006). As Klug (2007: 12) notes, we may 
infer that even though the HRA can fairly be described as a ‘Bill of Rights’, most 
people in the UK do not see it as such.  
  
The Hansard Society’s 2008 Audit of Political Engagement (based on more than 
1,000 face-to-face interviews in 2007) found significantly lower levels of enthusiasm. 
The issue of ‘whether Britain needs a new Bill of Rights’ scored third lowest out of 11 
constitutional issues for public understanding at 28 per cent (Hansard Society, 2008: 
5). A quarter of respondents were dissatisfied that Britain does not have a Bill of 
Rights, while 63 per cent were ‘effectively neutral’ (Hansard Society, 2008: 28-29). 
Only 14 per cent identified the lack of a Bill of Rights as being among their top three 
priorities for change (Hansard Society, 2008: 31). In Wales, understanding fell to 12 
per cent, with correspondingly lower levels of dissatisfaction at the lack of a Bill.  
 
Vizard (forthcoming) finds high levels of overall public support for the inclusion of a 
range of social and economic rights in a Bill of Rights (such as the right to healthcare 
and the right to education) and civil and political rights (such as the right to freedom 
of expression, the right to elections and the right to freedom of conscience, religion 
and belief). Although variations in support between population subgroups – such as 
by ethnicity, and religion and belief – are important in some instances, highest level 
of educational qualification and social class appear to be the most consistent and 
influential drivers of public attitudes towards a range of rights. Vizard suggests that 
survey methodology – for example, whether the term ‘human rights’ is specifically 
referenced and whether survey questions are ‘prompted’ or ‘unprompted’ – was also 
found to be an important factor in explaining variations in the findings of the various 
polling and survey exercises on public attitudes in this area.  
 
Vizard’s observation may help to explain the apparent discrepancy between the other 
survey results. The 2006 ICM State of the Nation poll gauged support for a Bill in the 
context of specific rights it might contain, including the right to a fair trial by jury and 
the right to hospital treatment on the National Health Service within a reasonable 
time, each supported by almost 90 per cent of those polled. The Hansard survey did 
not discuss specific rights; it concludes that, compared with other constitutional 
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issues, the question of whether Britain needs a new Bill of Rights is ‘among the most 
technical and the vaguest’ and has no ‘real resonance, at least when stated in these 
terms’ (Hansard Society, 2008: 39).  
 
Overall, these findings suggest the need for caution when assessing polling data 
about human rights. People may be quick to approve certain rights, but reluctant for 
them to be universal and unaware of the trade-offs they might require in public policy. 
We may infer from these polls that public understanding about human rights is 
generally low and that popular enthusiasm for a Bill of Rights in the abstract is not 
proven. The JCHR (2008a: 79) notes that any government will have an ‘uphill task to 
stimulate and inspire public debate’. 
 
4.7  Conclusion 
Overall, this review suggests that current circumstances for any process to create a 
new UK Bill of Rights are unfavourable. Public understanding of – or enthusiasm for - 
a new Bill of Rights is not assured and there is little discernible popular or civil society 
momentum behind the idea. To date, the consultation on the government’s 2009 
Green Paper has not reached the wider public sphere. It remains to be seen how far 
the deliberative events organised by the Ministry of Justice might be used to frame 
debate or ignite public interest, and how far the consultation will engage directly with 
disadvantaged and disaffected groups. Most interviewees in the UK argued that a 
body independent of government would be better placed than a government 
department to win public trust in the consultation process and to raise awareness of 
the idea of a new Bill of Rights as a constitutional enterprise and not ‘just another 
piece of legislation’.   
 
Many interviewees and seminar participants suggested that the political discourse 
surrounding a Bill of Rights has not been commensurate with the gravity and 
complexity of the project. One interviewee argued that the process had become 
unduly politicised; while politicians should not be sidelined, their influence should be 
‘appropriately counterbalanced’. Some interviewees expressed disquiet about the 
prevalence of language and stories which in some instances have distorted the 
purported effects of human rights and the HRA. Colm O’Cinneide spoke of a 
‘staggering level of assertion’, adding that: 
  
Political positioning has replaced serious consideration … [A Bill of Rights] 
is a fundamental piece of the constitutional architecture: it can’t be made 
subject to the day-to-day need for political rhetoric ... This is deadly 
serious stuff and it should be treated as such. 
(interview, 18 December 2009) 
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A striking feature of this debate is the lack of acknowledgement that the HRA is 
viewed by authoritative commentators to be a Bill of Rights (see section 1.3). While 
Labour has pledged to protect the HRA, the origin of the Act as part of a wider 
constitutional project to protect and promote human rights is rarely articulated. 
Conservative discourse about the need for a British Bill of Rights is predicated on the 
assertion that Britain does not already have one. Some interviewees in the UK 
argued that any process to create a new Bill of Rights must entail a convincing case 
as to why it might be needed. Qudsi Rasheed of JUSTICE noted that:  
 
At the moment the reasons advanced are to varying degrees illegitimate – 
populist or cosmetic – and not sufficient grounds on which to base a Bill of 
Rights … The UK is not starting with a blank canvas – we have the HRA, 
the ECHR and the EU Charter [of Fundamental Rights]. We need to look 
at what we’ve got, what works, what doesn’t work and why. 
(interview, 23 November 2009) 
 
This observation underscores the importance in any future process to provide 
impartial information and promote measured debate about existing human  
rights protections.  
THE UK CONTEXT: DEVOLUTION 
5.  The UK context: devolution 
 
5.1  Introduction  
This section examines (i) the legal and constitutional implications and (ii) the political 
implications of devolution for any decision to amend or repeal the Human Rights Act 
(HRA) and/or to enact a new Bill of Rights.  
 
5.2  The legal and constitutional dimension35 
The HRA applies throughout the UK, including in the devolved jurisdictions. The 
devolved authorities and institutions have no competence to act in any manner that is 
contrary to the rights in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).36 
Further, specific provision is made in both the Scotland Act 1998 and the Northern 
Ireland Act 1988 to prevent the devolved Parliament and Assembly from modifying 
the HRA.37 
  
The HRA and the ECHR are ‘tied and embedded’ into the complex devolution 
statutes (JUSTICE, 2010: 11). The HRA incorporates most of the rights contained in 
the ECHR and the devolution statutes incorporate the HRA directly into their own 
frameworks; thus, the substantive rights protected under both the HRA and the 
devolution statutes are the same (JUSTICE, 2010: 17).38  
 
Further, the procedural mechanisms in sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the HRA are, in 
different ways, adopted explicitly or implicitly in the devolution statutes (JUSTICE, 
2010: 14-17). The duty of the courts to take into account Strasbourg case law found 
in the HRA has been implied by the courts as being a requirement under the 
devolution statutes (JUSTICE, 2010: 15). Analogous provisions to the interpretive 
obligation to construe legislation compatibly with Convention rights found in the HRA 
are found in the devolution statutes (JUSTICE, 2010: 15-16). In summary, JUSTICE 
(2010: 3) notes that: 
 
The devolution statutes and the HRA are tied together in order to provide 
mutually supporting and complementary rights protection, both in terms of 
substantive rights and procedural mechanisms.  
                                                            
35  See JUSTICE (2010) for a recent and authoritative discussion of devolution and human 
rights.  
 
36  s29 and s54 Scotland Act 1998 (SA); s6 and s24 Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA); s81 
and s94 Government of Wales Act 2006 (GWA 2006) 
 
37  s29 and Schedule 4 SA; ss6(2f) and 7(1) NIA 
 
38  s126, SA; s98 NIA; s158 GWA 2006 
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It adds that, as a consequence: 
 
From a legal perspective, if the HRA was amended or repealed, and/or a 
bill of rights was enacted covering the devolved jurisdictions, there would 
almost certainly be a need for amendments to the devolution statutes. 
 
Further, JUSTICE (2010: 3) argues, any such decision is likely, from a constitutional 
perspective, to require the consent of the Scottish Parliament and the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. This is given through a so-called Sewel Motion which is required 
when the Westminster Parliament seeks to legislate on areas which have been 
devolved (or, in the case of Northern Ireland, ‘transferred’).  
 
Underlying this analysis is a legal debate about whether ‘human rights’ are, under the 
devolution statutes, a devolved matter or one reserved to Westminster – or, rather, a 
set of overarching provisions that apply to all categories of legislation, wherever it is 
made (JUSTICE, 2010: 17-18). JUSTICE suggests that a strong argument can be 
made that ‘human rights’ have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, or at least that the ‘observation and implementation’ of 
the ECHR, has been devolved.39 It argues that (JUSTICE, 2010: 3): 
 
As such, because any amendment to, or repeal of, the HRA and/or legislation 
enacting a bill of rights covering the devolved jurisdictions would touch upon 
‘human rights’ or the ‘observation and implementation’ of the ECHR, from a 
constitutional perspective, the consent of the Scottish Parliament and the 
Northern Irish Assembly would be needed. 
 
Even if this argument is rejected, and ‘human rights’ are seen as a reserved matter, 
JUSTICE (2010: 20) suggests consent would still be required for any legislation in 
the field of human rights (including any amendment to the HRA or passing of new 
legislation) which touched upon areas of devolved competence. These include 
housing, education and local government and, in Scotland (and, subject to approval 
in the Assembly, in Northern Ireland from April 2010), policing and criminal justice.  
                                                            
39  This argument is based on the practice of the devolved jurisdictions in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland and the creation and respective remits of the human rights commissions 
in different parts of the UK (JUSTICE, 2010: 19-20). Note that these arguments do not 
apply to Wales; the GWA 2006 specifies exactly what powers have been devolved. 
Further, there is no requirement for consent from the Welsh Assembly.  
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David Russell, Head of Communication and Education at the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission (NIHRC)40, argued that the operating procedures of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly may, in addition, require concurrent majorities from both 
main communities (British unionist and Irish nationalist) represented in the Assembly 
for the motion of consent to pass:  
 
There is a risk therefore that a UK Bill would be vetoed by the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, due to its operating procedures, thus forcing the 
Westminster government to take the unpalatable decision of trying to force 
legislation through in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  
(seminar, 1 December 2009) 
 
Northern Ireland presents further constitutional complexities. The 1998 Belfast 
(Good Friday) Agreement stated that:41 
 
The British government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland 
law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct 
access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including 
power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of 
inconsistency.  
 
Thus, a decision to repeal the HRA, or to amend the HRA and/or enact a UK Bill of 
Rights covering Northern Ireland in a way which diminished existing human rights 
protection, would be likely to breach the Good Friday Agreement. Further, it may put 
the UK in breach of its international treaty obligations owed to the Republic of 
Ireland as one of the guarantors of the Agreement (JUSTICE, 2010: 23; David 
Russell, seminar, 1 December 2009).  
  
Russell stated that:  
 
It is clear that in order to ensure there is no breach of the Belfast [Good 
Friday] Agreement the starting point for any debate on a UK Bill must 
guarantee that the HRA will remain and that there will be no regression 
from those provisions of the ECHR already given domestic effect.  
(seminar, 1 December 2009) 
                                                            
40  We are grateful to David Russell for allowing us to cite his presentation to the seminar on 
1 December 2009.  
 
41  See http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf 
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There is no settled view on the seriousness of these legal and constitutional 
implications. Ministers have spoken of ‘tricky’ drafting issues, rather than matters of 
principle, arising from the devolution settlements (Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR), 2008a: 29). The JCHR (2008a: 95-96) argues that it would be desirable to 
have Bills of Rights at both the UK and devolved levels:  
 
The devolution settlement creates certain difficulties for a UK Bill of Rights, 
but we do not accept that it creates an insuperable obstacle to such a Bill. 
 
By contrast, JUSTICE (2010: 27) concludes that:  
 
Amendments to the HRA or legislating for a bill of rights would be 
dangerous and risky – to the protection of rights, to the constitution of the 
UK, and to the Union itself.  
  
Some interviewees were, like the JCHR, persuaded in principle of the case for an 
overarching Bill with either additional chapters or separate Bills covering the 
devolved nations. None supported the idea of an ‘English’ Bill of Rights. Several 
interviewees suggested that retaining the HRA as a minimum floor would allow the 
devolved nations to develop their own Bills or to opt into a more expansive UK Bill of 
Rights covering England and the powers reserved to Westminster. Colm O’Cinneide 
argued that:  
 
As a matter of constitutional principle, an instrument to guarantee 
fundamental rights such as the HRA should ideally apply to the whole 
territory … However, additional rights guarantees could be introduced in 
different parts of the country, or the devolved assemblies could choose to 
opt into a framework established by Westminster. This could get messy 
but would be technically possible as long as choice resides with devolved 
assemblies and the process of drawing up such an instrument respects 
their competency and self-determination.  
(interview, 18 December 2009) 
  
The legal and constitutional implications of devolution are the subject of continuing 
debate which it is beyond our scope to resolve. What is clear is that the process of 
creating either a UK or British Bill of Rights presents political challenges that the UK 
parties are only starting to confront. 
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 5.3  The political dimension 
 
The view from Westminster  
The UK government’s 2007 Governance of Britain Green Paper did not mention 
devolution and spoke of a ‘British’ Bill of Rights. Its 2009 Green Paper, by contrast, 
said that consideration of a UK Bill of Rights and Responsibilities would need to 
involve the devolved legislatures and executive bodies and the human rights 
commissions around the UK ‘in order to generate the degree of consensus 
appropriate’ to such legislation (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 61). The JCHR stated in 
2008 that the required dialogue between central government and the devolved 
administrations did not yet seem to have begun (JCHR, 2008a: 31), an impression 
borne out by this review. 
 
For its part, the Conservative Party (Grieve, 2009a) has stated that in creating a 
‘British’ Bill of Rights, it would wish to: 
 
... respect the devolution settlements and so does not want to impose 
change against the will of devolved administrations in devolved matters. 
We want therefore to proceed by agreement with the principle very much 
in mind, particularly for Scotland, that its own national tradition of rights 
and liberties is different from that of England and Wales. 
 
The Conservatives have not specified what proceeding ‘by agreement’ might mean in 
terms of the consultation process. 
 
In relation to a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights (see section 2.6), the UK government 
has said it does not wish debate around a UK instrument to detract from the process 
relating to a potential bill reflecting the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland 
(Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 60). The two processes have, in practice, become 
connected. The Northern Ireland office (NIO, 2009: 15) has said it is important that:  
 
... decisions reached in respect of Northern Ireland are taken with full 
awareness of the developing national debate about the best way of 
protecting our rights and discharging our mutual responsibilities. 
 
For his part, David Cameron has said that he considers that the commitment to 
legislate on additional rights protections for Northern Ireland contained within the 
Good Friday Agreement could be adequately provided for by drafting a sub-section 
for inclusion in a future ‘British’ Bill (Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
2009). David Russell suggested that if a future Conservative government 
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implemented this approach, it would mean that the debate on a UK Bill of Rights 
would become ‘bound up in the intricacies of the peace process’:  
 
Moreover, one must presume that if a sub-section in a UK Bill is proposed 
in order to reflect the particular circumstance of Northern Ireland, then 
Scotland and Wales may seek a similar opportunity. 
(seminar, 1 December 2009) 
 
The view from the devolved nations  
Some interviewees and seminar participants reported scepticism and unease in the 
devolved nations about the competing political agendas underpinning the UK Bill of 
Rights project. They pointed to the absence of clear terms of reference for a UK-wide 
debate about a Bill of Rights (such as that contained in the NIHRC’s mandate) and 
the lack of an agreed methodology for conducting consultation or deliberation. The 
fact that negotiations between the parties responsible for legislating at Westminster 
and between the UK government and the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland 
executives have not started in earnest, or in public, appears to have exacerbated  
this uncertainty.  
 
Further, some seminar participants suggested that any UK-wide process, if 
insensitively handled, risks being seen as a move to centralise power, values and 
identity - at odds with devolution processes which are rooted in recognition of the 
multi-national character of the UK and the principle of self-determination.  
 
A process to create a Bill of Rights, whether described as ‘British’ or as covering the 
UK, risks inflaming sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland. Members of the British 
unionist community will not wish Northern Ireland to be excluded from any process 
that helps reinforce ‘Britishness’, while Irish (and Scottish) nationalists will not want to 
be included (JUSTICE, 2010: 24-25). David Russell noted that:  
 
For many people in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, the idea of a 
British or UK Bill of Rights suggests a centralisation programme that runs 
counter to their understanding of the devolution settlements ... In Northern 
Ireland, which is part of the island of Ireland, not Great Britain, but which 
remains constitutionally part of the UK, the very notion that any UK Bill 
should reinforce a sense of Britishness is geographically nonsense and 
politically loaded, if not dangerous.  
(seminar, 1 December 2009)  
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Some interviewees and seminar participants expressed concern about how any  
UK process might impact upon the protracted process of creating a Bill of Rights  
for Northern Ireland. One noted that the NIHRC has recently begun discussions  
with Dublin on an all-Ireland Charter of Rights, as mandated by the Good  
Friday Agreement:  
 
These discussions were long-delayed so as not to complicate or confuse 
the separate process relating to a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. 
Westminster parties have displayed no such sensitivity about timing.  
(seminar, 1 December 2009)  
  
Some interviewees in Scotland suggested that the politically contested nature of 
devolution creates a difficult environment in which to pursue a UK or British Bill, 
which could become a proxy for other issues relating to the Union. The Scottish 
Justice Minister, Kenny MacAskill, told the JCHR (2008b: Ev 59) that the Scottish 
government had not been significantly involved in discussions on a Bill of Rights;  
nor would it countenance regression from current mechanisms for protecting  
human rights: 
 
We have the Human Rights Act and ECHR incorporated into our founding 
principles … We are happy with that and as a Government party [the 
Scottish National Party] we seek to expand upon that if and when the 
constitutional settlement changes.  
 
Some seminar participants, too, suggested that any process which had the stated or 
implicit purpose of regression would be politically volatile in Scotland. The Scottish 
Parliament has built on the protections in the HRA - outwards (internationally) and 
upwards beyond the UK floor, for example in the fields of mental health, adult social 
care and housing. As one participant noted:  
 
To repeal the Human Rights Act now would be confusing for public 
authorities, undermining progress that has been made so far … The HRA 
has much unfulfilled potential – the current debate about weakening 
protection is untimely and unfortunate.  
(seminar, 1 December 2009)  
  
Some seminar participants noted the risk of a disconnection between the political 
discourse at Westminster and that in the devolved nations. As one of them 
commented: 
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... the Magna Carta resonates less strongly in Scotland than, say, the 
Declaration of Arbroath [for independence] or the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
(seminar, 1 December 2009)  
 
Similar concerns were expressed in Wales. Jane Williams, Lecturer in Law at 
Swansea University, noted that human rights (and especially children’s rights) have 
featured prominently in political debate and public policy development in Wales and 
the priority now is to ensure implementation and achieve impact ‘on the ground’ 
(interview, 21 January 2010). A distinctly Welsh notion of citizenship has emerged 
which is rooted in rights and the notions of universality and community rather than 
(as in England) notions of individual choice and responsibility. Williams suggested 
that repealing the HRA would be ‘politically very difficult’ in Wales. Further: 
 
A Bill of Rights for Wales would look different from a Bill of Rights written 
in England. … If there’s a move to do this at UK or British level, I’m sure 
there would be a keen appetite for separate consideration for Wales and 
for a separate public debate with the ability to produce a separate set of 
ideas about what would go into a Bill.  
  
5.4  A UK-wide consultation process? 
There was a strong consensus among interviewees and seminar participants that 
how the process is designed in relation to the devolved nations is of paramount 
importance. Aileen McHarg, Senior Lecturer in Public Law at the University of 
Glasgow, argued that even if a Sewel Motion was passed (see section 5.2): 
 
I would question whether that would be anywhere near sufficient to say 
that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish people have consented to 
this process. 
(interview, 10 December 2009)  
 
Francesca Klug added that any process must engage Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland in their own right and would need separate processes in all three (interview, 
13 January 2010). Graham Smith noted that the process would need to be integrated 
to legitimate the outcome as a UK Bill of Rights (interview, 9 November 2009). This 
could take the form of a UK citizens’ assembly or comparable body (see also 
Runswick, 2007). Smith suggested there would also need to be tailored consultations 
to ‘burrow down’ to particular communities in each devolved nation.  
 
 
80 
 
THE UK CONTEXT: DEVOLUTION 
81 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Devolution presents considerable legal, constitutional and political obstacles that, 
while they may not be insuperable, must be negotiated sensitively if UK parties are to 
progress the Bill of Rights project. It appears highly likely that if the HRA were 
amended or repealed, and/or a Bill of Rights were enacted covering the devolved 
jurisdictions, there would be a need for amendments to the devolution statutes. 
Further, such a decision would almost certainly require the consent of the devolved 
legislatures in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
 
The terms of reference for a UK-wide process and the methodologies by which it 
might be pursued have not been determined, either between the parties responsible 
for legislating at Westminster or between the UK government and the Scottish, Welsh 
and Northern Ireland executives; this has exacerbated a sense of unease and 
disengagement in the devolved nations.  
DEVELOPING A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UK 
6.  Key principles  
 
6.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, we propose key principles which should underpin the creation of a Bill 
of Rights based upon the evidence from experience in other jurisdictions. These 
principles are consistent with, and build upon, those established by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (section 1.1) and with the ‘non-negotiables’ advocated by 
the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) in its inquiry into a UK 
Bill of Rights (JCHR, 2008a: 91-92).  
 
We note that a significant proportion of interviewees in the UK, viewing current 
political conditions as unfavourable, are concerned about such a process happening 
at all. They advocate greater efforts to promote understanding and implementation of 
the Human Rights Act (HRA) and a more considered process of reflection on the 
broader issue of a written constitution. Therefore, these principles are suggested as 
both (i) requirements for the conduct of any future process and (ii) a set of criteria to 
inform the decision about whether that process is worth engaging in and against 
which it might be held up to scrutiny.  
 
6.2  The principles  
A process of creating a Bill of Rights should be:  
 
Non-regressive 
Any process to create a new Bill of Rights must go forwards, not backwards. In the 
UK, the government (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 58), the JCHR (2008a: 91) and the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission42 have each stated unequivocally that any 
future UK Bill of Rights should not dilute existing protection provided by the HRA. 
This is either in relation to the specific rights protected, or by weakening the existing 
machinery for the protection of Convention rights. Interviewees and seminar 
participants overwhelmingly endorsed this view. Some suggested that there is an 
important ethical dimension to the process of creating a Bill of Rights which 
recognises that human rights are rooted in human struggles against oppression and 
injustice. As one put it: ‘they are not ours to throw away’. Moreover, any process that 
starts from a premise of going backwards would disturb norms established across the 
democratic world and set a damaging precedent internationally.  
 
A subsidiary principle here is: no repeal without replacement. Any future government 
must commit unequivocally to retaining the HRA unless and until a Bill of Rights, 
protecting human rights to at least the same extent as the HRA, is enacted.  
                                                            
42  See www.equalityhumanrights.com/legislative-framework/bill-of-rights/ 
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Transparent  
Politicians must be transparent about the purpose of a Bill of Rights and the terms of 
reference for the process by which they propose to create it. This entails a clear 
procedural commitment to act on the results of public consultation and deliberation 
within certain parameters which must be clearly stated and justified. The methods 
employed to consult the public must also be transparent and open to scrutiny and 
those designing the process should explain the advantages and disadvantages of the 
chosen approach. Transparency must extend to the final outcome, with a clear 
rationale for the inclusion of specific provisions and how these relate to community 
preferences and experiences and to international standards.  
  
Independent  
The consultative body must be independent of government. A Bill of Rights would 
affect the relationship between parliament, the government and the courts, and 
between the individual and the government. Public trust is likely to be enhanced if the 
body running the process is seen to be independent and to have no vested interest in 
the outcome. While the government will set the framework and provide resources, 
the process must not be owned by ministers or be manipulated for partisan ends.  
 
Democratic 
For the outcome to be seen as having democratic legitimacy, the process must also 
be democratic. Bills of Rights are not only a constraint on repressive government; 
they are also a positive instrument to enable relatively powerless groups to have a 
more effective say in the democratic process. People must be encouraged to see 
that they have a stake in the process and understand what that stake is. As Ian 
O’Flynn noted:  
 
If [a Bill of Rights] is to have meaning for people and become part of 
British constitutional tradition, people have to have a real say in its 
creation … It must be their Bill of Rights, not be superimposed by an 
intellectual or political elite.  
(interview, 27 October 2009) 
 
Inclusive 
The process should place the highest premium on eliciting the views and 
experiences of groups whose human rights are most vulnerable to being breached, 
and should give those voices an elevated status in the processing of responses. Any 
process should also include meaningful efforts to elicit the views of disaffected 
groups who are most alienated from the legal and political system. This will generally 
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require combining qualitative and quantitative methods and providing multiple 
opportunities for people to participate.  
 
Deliberative and participative 
The process must be participatory and, as one seminar participant put it, ‘an exercise 
in building citizenship rather than just market research’. Deliberative forums have 
been shown to engender public trust if they are adequately publicised, properly 
constructed to be representative and independent from government and if 
government gives clear procedural commitments to act on their recommendations. 
Deliberative forums should not be used in isolation, but rather as a vehicle to inform 
and engage the wider public. 
 
Educative 
Consultation and deliberation should be as unconstrained as possible whilst being 
informed to the greatest extent that it can be about existing human rights protections 
and obligations. The UK does not start with a blank sheet in terms of human rights 
protection. A minimum requirement of a consultation process is the provision of 
impartial and accessible information (in appropriate formats and languages) and a 
concerted strategy, adhered to by all parties, to correct prevalent myths and 
misperceptions about human rights and the HRA. The public must also be informed 
about the duty to respect the rights of others. 
  
Reciprocal  
Consultation and deliberation should be a two-way process in which the government, 
and not just those being consulted, is educated. The imprint of the process must be 
visible and acknowledged in the final outcome both of the consultation and 
consequent government action.  
 
Rooted in human rights 
The process of creating a Bill of Rights must be consistent with human rights 
principles. These principles include respect for the dignity and autonomy of 
individuals and the right to participate. These principles are internationally recognised 
and not subject to political whim or contingency; nor can they be trumped by 
considerations such as public safety or security or requirements to exercise  
individual responsibility.  
 
Timed  
Any process must have a clear timeframe with, at a suitable juncture, a momentum-
building phase. It must not be indeterminate: the government must give a clear 
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procedural commitment to act at the end of the process within clearly  
stated parameters.  
 
Symbolic 
A process should be designed that is suitably ambitious for its stated purpose and  
for the undertaking of a constitutional enterprise. The government must have a  
clear answer to the question posed by Andrew Dismore MP, who chairs the JCHR:  
 
What are we trying to achieve here? Do we want a Bill of Rights that’s 
going to last for 200 years or 10 years? Are we trying to create a written 
constitution or are we simply tinkering with the HRA?  
(interview, 7 January 2010) 
 
If the outcome aspires to endure, then, as one seminar participant noted, it must  
be ‘myth-making’:  
 
People should have a sense that they did, or at least could have, 
participated in the process, creating a compelling story … This creates 
buy-in in a way that experts and elites cannot.  
 
Designed to do no harm 
The process should be adequately resourced for the stated purpose and there should 
be a political commitment to act on the outcome of consultation. A process is better 
not done at all than done badly. Disillusionment is contagious and corrosive; trust in 
the political process is fragile.  
 
Respectful of the devolution settlements 
All these principles apply to the design of a process which seeks to include the 
devolved nations. Specifically, choice should reside with the devolved assemblies 
and the process should respect their competency and self-determination. 
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7.  Policy implications  
 
7.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse the policy implications of the evidence presented in 
Chapters 2 to 5 and the principles listed in Chapter 6. We address these 
observations to a range of actors who are concerned with the protection and 
promotion of human rights and/or who might be involved in designing - or seeking to 
influence - a future consultation process. These include: the UK government and the 
devolved executive bodies; the Westminster Parliament and the devolved 
legislatures; the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission and the Scottish Human Rights Commission; non-
governmental organisations and other civil society actors, and academics and 
practitioners.  
 
7.2  Pre-conditions for engagement 
The principles in Chapter 6 are fundamental and, to a degree, interdependent. The 
question arises, are they a pre-condition for engagement in any future process? We 
suggest that the principle of non-regression is of a higher order: without an 
unequivocal guarantee that the purpose of a Bill of Rights process is to augment 
international standards and to maintain their incorporation into domestic law, the 
other principles relating to process are likely to seem immaterial. We suggest that 
any actor concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights would, if a 
consultation were predicated on regression, be bound to reject the process in terms 
of formal endorsement or engagement.  
 
This is consistent with the position of the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (JCHR) which states that the principle of non-regression is ‘non-negotiable’; it 
suggests specific guiding principles for a Bill of Rights process including that it must 
‘build on the HRA without weakening its mechanisms in any way’ and ‘supplement 
the protections in the [European Convention on Human Rights]’ (JCHR, 2008a: 91).  
 
The corollary of this position is that any future government must provide (and non-
governmental actors should demand) an unambiguous and public statement of intent 
and terms of reference for the consultation process, along with clear procedural 
commitments to act within the stated parameters.  
 
Actors concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights should also 
highlight the implications of a process predicated on regression for the UK’s existing 
international human rights obligations and its role and position in the Council of 
Europe and European Union. They should advocate for the importance of the UK as 
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a prime carrier of human rights values internationally and highlight the damaging 
precedent that a process predicated on regression would set.  
  
7.3  Certifying non-regression 
Subject to the assurances sought above, any future government should establish 
(and actors concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights should 
advocate for) an independent committee of experts, who might be appointed on a 
cross-party basis, to provide a ‘kitemark’ throughout the process that the principle of 
non-regression is being upheld.  
 
7.4  Designing the process to produce an outcome with democratic legitimacy 
Any future government should, drawing from precedents in other jurisdictions, 
establish an independent body to run the consultation process. Contingent upon the 
assurances sought in sections 7.2 and 7.3, actors concerned with the protection and 
promotion of human rights should advocate for a consultative process that is run 
independently of government and designed to engender public trust.  
 
Another key principle is transparency: actors concerned with the protection and 
promotion of human rights should influence and monitor the design of process to 
ensure that any future government does not ‘pick and mix’ from available 
methodologies in order to manufacture apparent consensus behind measures which 
would not, in fact, have democratic legitimacy. Experience from other jurisdictions, 
while it cannot be transplanted uncritically to the UK, provides a bedrock of 
knowledge that can be drawn upon – for example, the imperative to link deliberative 
forums to the broader public sphere and to pursue meaningful engagement with 
disaffected and marginalised groups in society.   
 
7.5  Influencing the terms of debate: a concordat  
As Francesca Klug noted in stark terms: ‘It would be unprecedented to have a Bill of 
Rights based on the trashing of a human rights treaty’ (interview, 13 January 2010). 
This observation is relevant to both content and process. Actors concerned with the 
protection and promotion of human rights should advocate for a concordat that would 
bind all parties that signed it to certain rules of engagement; principally, an 
agreement not to use language or bring stories into the public domain that knowingly 
distort the purported impact of human rights and the HRA. This would help to ensure 
that all parties buy into a process which is avowedly educative and non-partisan and 
does not trade in myths or seek to use the Bill of Rights debate as a proxy for 
unrelated issues. Parties which declined to sign the concordat would be answerable 
to the public for their conduct.  
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7.6  Devolution 
Actors concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights should 
champion the principle that choice should reside with the devolved assemblies and 
that the process of creating a UK Bill of Rights should respect their competency and 
self-determination. It is imperative that those actors with appropriate expertise and 
authority highlight the legal, constitutional and political implications of devolution  
for any decision to amend or repeal the HRA and/or to enact a UK or ‘British’  
Bill of Rights.  
  
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1  List of interviewees 
 
Name Title Institution/role Country 
Sylvia Bell Principal Legal and 
Policy Analyst 
New Zealand Human 
Rights Commission 
New Zealand 
Robert Blackburn Professor of 
Constitutional Law 
King’s College, London UK 
Frank Brennan Professor of Law 
Public Policy 
Institute 
Australian Catholic 
University; former Chair, 
National Human Rights 
Consultation Committee 
Australia 
Geoff  Budlender   Barrister and acting High 
Court judge; founder of 
Legal Resources Centre; 
Trustee, Sigrid Rausing 
Trust 
South Africa 
Simon Burall Director Involve: the participation 
organisation 
UK 
Fred Chaney   Former federal minister 
for Aboriginal Affairs; 
former Chair, Consultation 
Committee for a Proposed 
WA Human Rights Act  
Australia 
Hilary Charlesworth Director, Centre for 
International 
Governance and 
Justice 
The Australian National 
University; former Chair, 
Australian Capital 
Territory inquiry into an 
ACT bill of rights  
Australia 
Joanna Collinge Executive Director New Zealand Human 
Rights Commission 
New Zealand 
Hugh Corder Dean, Faculty of 
Law 
University of Cape Town South Africa 
Brice Dickson Professor of 
International and 
Comparative Law  
Queen’s University, 
Belfast 
UK  
Andrew  Dismore MP Chair Joint Committee on 
Human Rights 
UK 
Catherine  Donnelly Barrister Blackstone Chambers; 
Principal Legal Adviser to 
the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights 
Commission on the 
drafting of a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland 
UK 
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Name Title Institution/role Country 
Ruth  Fox  Head of Parliament 
and Government 
programme  
Hansard Society UK 
John Gastil Professor, 
Department of 
Communication 
University of Washington USA 
Colin  Harvey Professor of Human 
Rights Law 
Queen’s University Belfast UK  
Paul  Kildea Director, Federalism 
Project, Gilbert and 
Tobin Centre of 
Public Law 
University of New South 
Wales 
Australia 
Francesca Klug Professorial 
Research Fellow 
London School of 
Economics 
UK 
Jenny  Leong Human Rights Act 
Campaign 
Coordinator 
Amnesty Australia Australia 
Phil Lynch Director and 
Principal Solicitor 
Human Rights Law 
Resource Centre  
Australia 
Aileen McHarg Senior Lecturer in 
Public Law 
University of Glasgow  UK 
Tom Mullen Head of School of 
Law 
University of Glasgow UK 
Colm O’Cinneide Reader in Laws University College London UK 
Ian O’Flynn Lecturer in Political 
Theory 
University of Newcastle UK 
Jason Pobjoy PhD candidate, 
Faculty of Law 
University of Cambridge UK 
Glenn  Preston Head of Projects and 
Communications 
Ministry of Justice UK 
Michael Raftery Head of Citizenship 
Education 
Hansard Society UK 
Qudsi Rasheed Legal Officer 
(Human Rights) 
JUSTICE UK 
Paul  Rishworth Auckland School of 
Law  
University of Auckland  New Zealand 
Michael Ritchie Director  Committee on the 
Administration of Justice 
UK  
David Russell Head of 
Communication and 
Education  
Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission  
UK 
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Name Title Institution/role Country 
Peter Russell Professor Emeritus, 
Political Science 
University of Toronto Canada 
Edward Santow Director, Charter of 
Human Rights 
Project, Gilbert and 
Tobin Centre of 
Public Law 
University of New South 
Wales 
Australia 
Chris Sidoti International human 
rights consultant 
Former Australian Human 
Rights Commissioner; 
Australian Law Reform 
Commissioner; 
independent chair of the 
Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights Forum  
Australia 
Graham Smith  Professor of Politics, 
Centre for 
Citizenship, 
Globalization and 
Governance 
University of Southampton UK 
Kate Temby Acting Director, 
Human Rights Unit 
Australian Human Rights 
Commission 
Australia 
Angela  Ward Barrister Bar Council, Law Library 
of Ireland  
Ireland 
Mark Warren Harold and Dorrie 
Merilees Chair for 
the Study of 
Democracy, 
Department of 
Political Science 
University of British 
Columbia 
Canada 
George Williams Anthony Mason 
Professor, Faculty of 
Law 
University of New South 
Wales; former Chair, 
Human Rights 
Consultation Committee, 
Victoria 
Australia 
Jane  Williams  Lecturer in Law Swansea University UK 
Andy Williamson Head of 
eDemocracy 
programme 
Hansard Society UK 
Jane  Winter Director British Irish Rights Watch UK 
Spencer Zifcak Director, Institute of 
Legal Studies  
Australian Catholic 
University 
Australia 
Senior official  (anonymous)  Northern Ireland Office UK 
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Appendix 2  Question guide for interviewees 
 
Questions for respondents involved in, or familiar with, processes outside 
Britain  
1. What do you consider to be the most important principles that should underpin 
the process of creating a Bill of Rights (or similar document)? In the process/es 
you know about, were these principles derived from international human rights 
standards and principles (for example the right to participation in public affairs)? 
What else informed them? 
 
2. What were the most – and least – successful aspects of the process/es you 
were involved in or familiar with? Were any unexpected challenges 
encountered? 
 
3. How open-ended was the process: which matters of substance were pre-
determined and which were open to deliberation (for example the principle of 
non-regression; the rights to be enshrined; the status and enforceability of those 
rights)? How significant was this factor in terms of public ownership of the 
resulting document? 
  
4. Which institution/s carried out the process? What was (and what should be) the 
role of a national human rights institution in the process? 
 
5. What lessons were learnt about how to conduct successful civic education, 
information or media campaigns? Was civic education about human rights a 
primary aim of the process and can you draw lessons about how this was 
achieved? 
 
6. What channels were created to facilitate public debate? How was technology 
used to broaden participation?  
 
7. What lessons were learnt about how best to engage specific population groups 
in the process of deliberation, in particular groups or communities that face 
discrimination, disadvantage or exclusion or who are considered ‘hard to 
reach’? Can you give examples of how the views of specific groups or 
communities were incorporated in the drafting process? 
  
8. What lessons were learnt about the use of particular consultation 
methodologies, for example opinion polling, deliberative polling, referendums? 
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9. How were diverse public contributions synthesised in the drafting process? How 
were minority views balanced against those of the majority?  
 
10. How were notions of responsibility constructed in the process, if at all? 
 
11. How were statements of values constructed in the process, if at all? 
 
12. Can you draw lessons about the optimum timescale for the process of creating 
a Bill of Rights?  
 
13. What lessons were learnt about how to ensure extensive input into the 
legislative process? How was cross-party consensus around the Bill of Rights 
sought or achieved? 
 
14. If you were working within a devolved or federal context, how were the issues 
raised by this context dealt with? How were the views and particular 
experiences of those in different nations (or states) captured and reflected? 
How was cross nation (or state) consensus achieved? If relevant, how were 
different legislative frameworks and legal traditions reflected? 
 
15. In relation to all these questions: how did the process of public participation 
influence the final shape of bills of rights in particular instances?  
 
16. To what extent do you consider experience drawn from outside the UK to be 
relevant to, or replicable in, the UK?  
 
17. Is there anything else that we have not discussed that you consider is important 
in the process of developing a Bill of Rights? 
 
Questions for respondents in Britain 
1. What do you consider to be the most important principles that should underpin 
the process of creating a Bill of Rights? Should these principles be derived from 
international human rights standards and principles (for example the right to 
participation in public affairs)? What else should inform them? 
 
2. What lessons can be drawn at this early stage from the way in which reform 
proposals have been initiated (for example the UK government’s Green Paper 
on Rights and Responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework)? 
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3. How open-ended should the consultation process be? Which matters of 
substance should, in your view, be pre-determined and which should be up for 
deliberation (for example the principle of non-regression; the rights to be 
enshrined; the status and enforceability of those rights; the inclusion of 
responsibilities; the inclusion of a statement of values)?  
 
4. Which bodies should carry out the process? What role do you think the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission or Scottish Human Rights Commission should 
play? 
 
5. Should raising public awareness, knowledge and understanding about human 
rights principles and standards (the Human Rights Act and the UK’s 
international human rights obligations) be a primary aim of the consultation 
process? How might this be achieved? 
 
6. Are there lessons you can share from your own work about the type of 
consultation methodologies that might best be used in a Bill of Rights process, 
for example opinion polling, deliberative polling, use of information and 
communications technology? You may wish to draw upon knowledge and 
experience of approaches to deliberative democracy that do not relate to a Bill 
of Rights as such but which might offer useful lessons with regard to process 
(for example citizens’ juries, participatory budgeting). 
 
7. Are there lessons you can share from your own work about how best to engage 
specific population groups in the process of deliberation, in particular groups or 
communities who face discrimination, disadvantage or exclusion or who are 
considered ‘hard to reach’?  
 
8. Are there lessons you can share about the potential role of third-sector 
organisations, including the voluntary and community sector, in a consultation 
process? 
 
9. Do you have a view on whether a referendum should be held, either to initiate 
the legislative stage of a Bill of Rights or after its enactment as a means of 
democratic entrenchment?  
 
10. What do you consider to be the implications of devolution for the process by 
which a UK Bill of Rights should be created? In particular, what are the legal, 
political or social issues relevant to Scotland England and Wales that should be 
taken into account in developing a Bill of Rights? 
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11. What do you consider to be key factors to ensuring that the engagement with 
the devolved administrations and civil society in each of the nations is effective? 
 
12. Do you have any other suggestions about how a Bill of Rights process might be 
carried out so as to achieve genuine and inclusive public deliberation and a 
sense of common ownership?  
 
13. Is there anything else that we have not discussed that you consider is important 
in the process of developing a Bill of Rights? 
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Appendix 3  Victoria human rights consultation  
 
The Human Rights Consultation Committee in Victoria released a community 
discussion paper entitled Have your say about human rights in Victoria.  
 
The paper asked 10 key questions to encourage debate. These were drafted ‘to be 
as open-ended as possible so that people responded to us without feeling 
constrained by the preferences expressed in the Statement of Intent which had been 
issued by the Victorian government. The 10 questions were: 
 
1. Is change needed in Victoria to better protect human rights? 
 
2. If change is needed, how should the law be changed to achieve this? 
 
3. If Victoria had a Charter of Human Rights, what rights should it protect? 
 
4. What should be the role of our institutions of government in protecting human 
rights? 
 
5. What should happen if a person’s rights are breached? 
 
6. What wider changes would be needed if Victoria brought about a Charter of 
Human Rights? 
 
7. What role could the wider community play in protecting and promoting human 
rights? 
 
8. What other strategies are needed to better protect human rights? 
 
9. If Victoria introduced a Charter of Human Rights, what should happen next? 
 
10. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about how human rights should 
be protected in Victoria? 
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Appendix 4  Western Australia human rights consultation  
 
The Consultation Committee for a Proposed WA (Western Australia) Human Rights 
Act released a community discussion paper entitled Human Rights for WA and 
invited people to make submissions. It also released a shorter summary document, 
Talking Human Rights in Western Australia, and a pamphlet, We Want Your Views.  
 
Each listed eight key questions relevant to the Committee’s brief, which the 
Committee asked the community to answer. These were: 
 
1. Should WA have a Human Rights Act? 
 
2. What rights should be protected in a WA Human Rights Act? 
 
3. What form should a WA Human Rights Act take? 
 
4.  How should a WA Human Rights Act require human rights to be protected? 
 
5.  Who should be required to comply with the human rights recognised in a WA 
Human Rights Act? 
 
6.  What should happen if a person’s human rights are breached? 
 
7.  If WA introduced a Human Rights Act what wider changes would be needed? 
 
8.  What else can the government and the community do to encourage a culture of 
respect for human rights in WA? 
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